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The unreliability of eyewitness memory has received 
increasing attention during the past several years. Several 
studies have examined the effects of expert psychological 
testimony regarding eyewitness memory. However, many courts 
have failed to allow psychological expert testimony on the 
grounds that it is too costly financially, too time 
consuming and unduly influences the jurors. The present 
study represents the first attempt to replicate one of the 
expert psychological studies, as well as being the first to 
examine the effects of judge's instructions regarding 
psychological research on eyewitness memory.
112 subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight
experimental conditions. Half of the subjects viewed a 
videotape of a highly confident eyewitness, while half 
viewed an eyewitness with low confidence. Subjects were 
then asked to view a videotape of a psychologist giving 
relevant expert testimony, a psychologist giving general 
expert testimony, a judge giving general instructions, or no 
further videotapes (control group). Subjects were then 
asked to complete a number of Likert-scale questions 
concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendent, and the 
subjects' basis for and confidence in their decision.
Results indicated that subjects in all conditions found 
the defendant innocent, thus failing to replicate the
results of the previous study. On those measures in which 
significant differences were obtained, the three forms of 
expert testimony did not differ from one another, thus
supporting the use of judge's instructions as a replacement 
for psychological expert testimony.
Results are discussed in terms of their implications 
for future research in expert testimony as well as 
implications for the legal system.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Wall (1965) has concluded that the average juror takes 
as absolute proof an eyewitness' identification of a 
suspect. In a case cited by Wall, a jury convicted a young 
man of murder even though the only eyewitness had previously 
stated that she could not correctly identify him.
Furthermore, the original description of him did not match,
he was not wounded although the criminal probably was, and a 
taxi driver who drove the murderer to the crime area could 
not positively identify him either. The literature on 
eyewitness identification has many examples such as this, in 
which an innocent person is falsely identified, convicted, 
and even jailed before subsequent clearing evidence is 
uncovered.
Staged-crime research also indicates that eyewitness
identifications are often unreliable. A study by Leippe, 
Wells, and Ostrom (1978) found that following a staged
crime, 34% of the witnesses were unable to identify the 
criminal from a six-person photo spread, 35% falsely 
identified the criminal, and only 31% accurately identified 
him. In a similar study by Warnick and Sanders (1980), 
"misses" and false identifications acounted for 76.7% of all 
responses.
1
2
Although fairly high rates of false identification have 
been found in the literature, the courts often discount this 
evidence on the theory that inaccurate witnesses may fail 
more than accurate witnesses to convince the jury of the 
reliability of their testimony . But some research suggests 
that jurors rely unduly upon eyewitness testimony and that 
jurors may be unable to distinguish accurate from inaccurate 
witnesses. Loftus (1974) found that when jurors were told 
that there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery of a grocery 
store, 18% found the defendant guilty. However, when jurors 
were told there was a single eyewitness to the crime, 72% 
convicted the defendant. In a third condition, in which 
jurors were told that the eyewitness had not been wearing 
his glasses, that he had less than 20/400 vision, and that 
therefore, he could not possibly have seen the thief's face, 
68% of the jurors still convicted the defendant. These data 
are consistant with Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) who 
found that eyewitnesses were believed 79.8% of the time. 
They also found that jurors were as likely to believe an 
eyewitness who made a false identification as they were to 
believe an eyewitness who had in fact identified the actual 
offender.
Results such as these merit considerable attention from 
both psychological researchers and the judicial system.
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This paper was designed to accomplish the following 
objectives :
(a) review psychological factors affecting eyewitness 
accuracy and reliability,
(b) related to (a), discuss memory processes as they relate 
to eyewitness performance,
(c) discuss the confidence - accuracy relationship in 
eyewitness testimony and juror's reliance on this 
relationship,
(d) review expert testimony research and research on judge's 
instructions and their potential for reversing some of the 
justice-impairing effects, and
(e) compare the effects of different types of expert 
testimony against a judge's instructions following an 
eyewitness of low or high confidence.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony
The unreliability of eyewitness testimony poses one of 
the most serious problems in the administration of criminal 
justice. A number of recent books and articles by
psychologists have begun to question the esteem given to
eyewitness identification evidence by the justice system 
(Buckhoutf 1974, 1976; Katz and Reid, 1977; Loftus, 1979; 
Warnick and Sanders, 1980; Woocher, 1977; Yarmey, 1979). 
Psychological research has isolated a number of factors 
which affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. 
Knowledge of these factors would certainly assist the juror 
in evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony in a 
particular situation. A discussion of all of these factors 
is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, twelve 
of the most common of these factors will be subsequently
reviewed in this section. Because these are twelve of the
most common and important factors affecting eyewitness 
identification, they have been chosen for use in the present 
investigation.
Crimes seldom occur under ideal observation or lighting
conditions. Darkness, fast movements, and the distance from
the criminal all contribute to the unreliability of
4
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eyewitness identification (Levine and Tapp, 1973). Visual 
efficiency drops markedly with poor or rapidly changing 
lighting. In conjunction with distracting noise or other 
activities, the attentional capacities of an individual may 
become spread too thin (Lezak, 1973).
Witnesses are often asked to make identifications after 
only a brief observation of the criminal. Research has 
found that shorter observation times result in less reliable 
identification and recall. Loftus (1972) and Hintzman
(1976) have found that picture recognition is a successively 
increasing function of exposure time. Laughery, et. al. 
(1971) found that 58% of subjects who had viewed a face for 
32 seconds could correctly identify it, whereas only 47% of 
those who had viewed the face for 10 seconds could correctly 
identify it.
The effects of the psychological concept of 
"retroactive inhibition" have been firmly documented. 
Simply put, the more time between the observation of a crime 
and the recall of that observation, the poorer a person's 
memory is of that event. Egan, Pittner, and Goldstein
(1977) found that the number of mistaken identifications 
made by eyewitnesses increased from 48% to 62% to 93% as the 
crime-identification interval was lengthened from 2 to 21 to 
56 days. Shepard (1967) found 100% correct recognition of 
pictures after a two-hour delay but only 57% correct
6
recognition after four months, (Note that if the subject 
simply guessed he would have been correct 50% of the time.)
A common misconception of the judicial system is the 
belief that victims* or witnesses* stress will increase 
their ability to recall the identity of a subject. In a 
representative case of this phenomenony in which a man was
tortured by starting a fire at his feet, the court stated
that "every peculiarity of each of the suspects must have 
been literally burned into the memory of both the victim and 
his wife" (cited in Katz and Reidy 1977) . In spite of
common beliefs such as this one, the bulk of psychological 
research demonstrates that perceptual abilities actually
decrease significantly when the observer is under stress.
The Yerkes-Dodson Law, first noted in 1908, states that 
stress increases performance up to a point, after which 
performance decreases. In crimes in which the witness 
perceives danger to self or others, the stress involved may 
well be greater than the optimal level. Research has found 
that witnesses are less capable of remembering details, less 
accurate in reading dials, less certain in detecting 
signals, and more susceptible to suggestion under stressful 
circumstances (Levine and Tapp, 1973) . A number of recent 
studies have indicated that more anxious eyewitnesses may 
tend to be less accurate in their testimony than non-anxious 
eyewitnesses (Muellar, Carlomusto, and Goldstein, 1978;
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Siegal and Loftus, 1978; and Zanni and Offerman, 1978).
Easterbrook (1959) has shown that under high stress 
people concentrate more and more on a few features of their 
environment, with a lessening of attention to other details. 
Buckhout (1974) found that under stressful conditions. Air 
Force officers tended to be less accurate observers, 
fixating their eyes on the joystick and other irrelevant 
targets as opposed to looking at the instruments and the 
ground for targets. Similarly an eyewitness may spend a 
great deal of time concentrating on the weapon of the 
criminal, and much less time processing other aspects of the 
situation. Loftus (1979) has used the term "weapon focus" 
to refer to this phenomenon. In a study by Johnson and 
Scott (1976, cited in Loftus, 1977) one highly stressed 
group of observers witnessed a man run into a room in which 
they were sitting, carrying a bloodied letter opener. A 
second group witnessed a man enter the room holding a pen 
with grease on his hands. In the second group 49% correctly 
identified the man. In the first group only 33% correctly 
identified him.
In a study related to the phenomenon of "weapon focus". 
Wells and Leippe (1981) found that eyewitnesses who paid 
less attention to peripheral, inanimate details in the room 
with the thief, were more accurate in identifying the thief. 
However, jurors behaved as though the memory for the thief's
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characteristics correlated positively with memory for 
peripheral trivia. That is, the jurors were more likely to 
believe the inaccurate witnesses who could recall peripheral 
details better. Accuracy in identifying the criminal is 
also reduced when the number of criminals increases, 
Clifford and Hollin (1981) found that as the number of 
criminals increased from one to three to five, the accuracy 
of the eyewitness testimony correspondingly decreased,
Loftus (1979) has suggested that testimony about an 
emotionally loaded incident should be treated with greater 
caution than testimony about a less emotional incident. 
This is based in large part on two studies by Clifford and 
his colleagues, Clifford and Scott (1978) found that for 
both men and women the ability to recall events was 
significantly worse for those who had seen a videotape of a 
violent event than for those who saw a nonviolent version, 
Clifford and Hollin (1981) found that witnesses were 
significantly less accurate in their testimony after viewing 
a woman being mugged than after viewing a woman being asked 
for directions.
The fact that most people have enormous difficulty 
estimating the duration of an event has received sufficient 
justification in the literature (Block, 1974; 
Doerhring,1961), According to Woocher (1977) people tend to 
judge time by the amount of activity occurring, During a
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sudden^ action-packed event, such as a crime, witnesses 
overestimate the length of time involved because of the 
flurry of activity that has occurred. In addition, 
witnesses undergoing stress or anxiety tend to overestimate 
the duration of the situation even further (Filer and Meals,
1949; Langer, Wapner, and Werner, 1961; Sarason and
Stoops, 1978).
Witnesses are often asked to estimate time in courts of 
law. However, Buckhout and his collègues (Buckhout, 1977;
Buckhout et.al. 1975), studying the effects of eyewitness
testimony in a realistic setting, found that witnesses who 
viewed an attack on a professor which actually lasted only 
3 4 seconds, estimated the incident to average 81 seconds. 
Two additional studies have shown the same tendency to 
overestimate time. Marshall (1966) showed subjects a film 
lasting 42 seconds. Two weeks later the subjects were asked 
to estimate how long the picture had taken. On the average, 
witnesses estimated the film lasted a minute and a half. 
Johnson and Scott (1976, cited in Loftus, 1979) found that 
men who had viewed a person for four seconds, estimated that 
it had been seven seconds on the average. Women estimated 
that they had viewed the target an average of 25 seconds.
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Another factor which affects the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification is the uniqueness or distinctiveness of the 
suspect's face. Recent research has found that 
high-distinctive or atypical faces are significantly better 
recognized than low-distinctive or typical faces (Courtois 
and Muellary 1981; Going and Ready 1974).
In many eyewitness identificationsy a person seen in 
one situation is confused or recalled as a person seen in a 
second situation. This phenomenon has been called 
"unconscious transference" by Loftus (1976) and may have 
occurred in the study by Buckhout (1974) in which an assault 
was staged upon a professor. Seven weeks after the assaulty 
witnesses were asked to identify the assailant from a group 
of six photographs. 40% of the witnesses identified the 
right man; however y over 40% identified an innocent 
bystander who had been near the scene of the assault but had 
not committed it.
In another study of "unconscious transference" Loftus
(1976) presented a story of six college students along with 
their photographs to a number of subjects. Only one of the 
photographs contained the face of the criminal. After three 
days the subjects were asked to identify the criminal from a 
set of five pictures shown them. In reality the actual 
criminal's photo was not included but the face of an 
incidental character in the story was included. Over 79% of
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those subjects making a selection chose the incidental 
character.
Perhaps the classic example of "unconscious 
transference" has been presented by Wall (1965). A ticket 
agent in a railroad station who was held up at gunpoint, 
subsequently identified a sailor in a lineup as the culprit. 
The sailor, however, had an iron-clad alibi and was 
released. When questioned, the ticket agent said he 
identified the sailor because he looked familiar. As it 
turned out, the sailor had purchased tickets from this agent 
on three seperate occasions. Apparently the witness 
recognized that the face was familiar, but did not remember 
the context in which it was familiar.
When witnesses are asked to make an identification from 
a lineup, a number of factors may affect the accuracy of 
that identification. One problem, as noted by Katz and Reid
(1977), occurs when the witness has already given a 
description of the criminal to the police. Later when asked 
to identify the suspect from a lineup, the witness will look 
for a suspect who fits the description he/she has already 
given to the police. In order for a lineup to be unbiased 
all of the participants must resemble the initial 
description given by the witness. Buckhout (1976) has 
suggested that a fair lineup be designed such that:
(a) all items have an equal chance of being
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selected by a person who did not see the 
suspect ;
(b) the items are similar enough to each other and 
to the original description of the suspect to 
be confusing to a person who is merely 
guessing; and
(c) the test is conducted without leading 
questions or suggestions from the test-giver.
(p.84)
The importance of this final point has been shown in a 
number of studies in which witnesses were influenced by the 
subtle suggestions of the interrogator. Hall and Ostrom
(197 5 f cited in Wells, 1978) found that telling the 
witnesses that the suspect "is in the lineup" led to more 
false identification than telling them that the suspect "may 
or may not" be in the lineup. Buckhout (1975) has found 
that the use of authority figures increases the frequency of 
attempted identifications, whether accurate or not. 
Buckhout and Friere (1975, cited in Katz and Reid, 1977) 
found that when police officers show witnesses a series of 
photographs, some of which are mug shots, the witnesses are 
more likely to identify one of the mug shots as the suspect. 
One of the most powerful ways in which police can bias 
eyewitness identification is with the use of the showup. In 
a showup, the suspect is presented singly to the witness for 
identification, usually in the presence of a police officer. 
Buckhout (1976) has suggested that the witness is more 
likely to cast aside doubts and simply trust the judgment of 
the police officer whom he subconsciously wishes to please
13
or fears to disagree with.
These twelve factors have been chosen for the current 
study on the basis of their frequency and importance in
affecting eyewitness identifications. However, they 
represent only a few of the many factors affecting the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Studies have found 
eyewitness identification to be affected by the significance 
of the event observed, the physical condition and age of the 
observer, personal biases, prior conditioning and
experience, the needs and motives of the witness, the race
of the suspect, the attractiveness of the suspect, etc., ad 
infinitum. It is apparent that these are powerful factors 
which have a major impact on the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony, and strongly suggest the need for expert 
testimony or judge's instructions to educate the juror about 
them.
14Memory
A comprehensive review of the theory and research on 
memory is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, a 
current model of memory (Loftus and Loftus, 1980), as well 
as a brief overview of the stages of memory and how 
distortions in memory can arise, will be presented. A 
condensed form of this information will be presented to the 
subject-jurors as part of the expert testimony.
The nature of memory reflects a complex system of 
processes which have generally been conceptualized as 
consisting of three hypothetical stages : (1) sensory
memory, (2) short-term memory, and (3) long-term memory 
(Yarmey, 1979). Sensory memory consists of the initial 
processing of information and is very rapid and superficial. 
Part of the information is selected for further processing 
at the next stage, short-term memory, while the rest of the 
information is lost quickly through decay or being bumped 
out of the system by new information.
Once the information enters short-term memory it is 
vulnerable to decay within the first thirty seconds, unless 
it is rehearsed for long-term storage. Generally, from 5 to 
9 bits of information can be stored in short-term memory at 
any one time (Miller, 1956). Rehearsal of short-term memory 
items results in transfer to long-term memory. Long-term
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memory is identified by an infinite capacity to store 
information over a lifetime.
From an applied perspective, the processes by which 
information gets into and out of memory have been broken 
down into three components: acquisition, retention, and
retrieval (Loftus, 1979; Yarmey, 1979; Wickelgren, 1981), 
Acquisition (or encoding) is the process of coding physical 
stimuli into the memory system. Retention is the storage of 
the coded information in some systematic, organized way. 
Retrieval is the process by which the material is recalled 
from storage. As Loftus (1979) points out, errors in memory 
may result from errors made during the original perception 
of the event (acquisition stage), distortion of stored
information by events occurring during the retention phase, 
or an inability to find stored information (retrieval
stage).
A common and misconceived model of memory by both 
researchers and laymen alike has been the notion of memory 
as a "videotape recorder", in which events are permanently 
and unalterably stored (Loftus, 1980; Loftus and Loftus, 
1980). In a survey of 75 psychologists and 94 laymen,
Loftus and Loftus (1980) found that 84 percent of the
psychologists and 69 percent of the laymen agreed with the 
statement that "Everything we learn is permanently stored in 
the mind". Typically, support for this model has come from
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Penfield*s brain stimulation studies and hypnotic 
phenomenon, Penfield (1969) reported that electrical
stimulation of parts of the brain of his neurosurgical
patients resulted in a re-experiencing of a forgotten event 
from their past. However, as Loftus and Loftus (1980) point 
out, spontaneous memory recall resulted in only 3.5% of 
Penfield*s cases and even these appeared to be 
reconstructions or inferences rather than actual memories.
Hypnosis has also been viewed as a retrieval technique 
capable of reactivating detailed memories from permanent 
storage (Cheek and LeCron, 1968), and thus supporting the 
"videotape recorder" model. However, recent research has 
found that hypnotized subjects are more vulnerable to memory 
distortions caused by leading questions than non-hypnotized 
subjects (Putnam, 1979) .
Loftus and collègues have demonstrated in a number of 
studies that stored memory can be distorted by later events. 
She has proposed a "reconstructive" rather than a "videotape 
recorder" model of memory to account for these distortions. 
In a series of four studies, Loftus (1975, 1977, 1978) has
been able to show that stored information can be altered by
subsequent information. In one study, Loftus (1975) showed 
subjects a film of a class being disrupted by eight 
demonstrators. Half of the subjects were subsequently asked 
if the leader of the four demonstrators was male, while the
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Other half were asked if the leader of the twelve 
demonstrators was male. One week later all subjects were 
asked to report the number of demonstrators in the film. 
Those subjects who had been previously asked the "four" 
question reported seeing an average of 6.4 people, whereas 
those subjects asked the "twelve" question recalled an 
average of 8.9 people.
Loftus (1975) has also shown that nonexistant objects 
can become incorporated into people's memories. Subjects 
who saw a film and were later asked a question about how 
fast the car was traveling when it passed the barn, were 
compared to subjects asked the question how fast was the car 
traveling on the country road. Although, in fact, no barn 
existed, 17% of those subjects who had previously been asked 
the question including the word barn claimed to have seen a 
barn as compared to 3% of the control subjects.
The way a question is phrased may also influence stored 
memory. Loftus and Zanni (1975) found that when subjects
were asked about nonexistant objects, the use of the word
"the" or "a" made a significant difference. When asked if
they had seen "the" broken headlight, 20% of the subjects
responded yes as compared to 6% of the subjects who
responded yes to the question "did you see "a" broken 
headlight?" Loftus and Palmer (1974) asked subjects to 
estimate the speed of a car in a film they had seen.
18
Subjects who were asked how fast the cars were going when 
they "smashed" each other estimated 40.8 mph, whereas those 
asked for the speed of the cars when they "hit" each other 
estimated 34.0 mph. This evidence of the malleable nature 
of stored memory has led to Loftus' support of a 
"reconstructive" model of memory, in which the recalled 
information may differ from the original stored information.
As evidenced by the above research, psychologists are 
becoming aware of the fact that memory is an active process 
that often introduces inaccuracies by adding details not 
present in the initial event itself. In the context of 
eyewitness identification, such modifications of memory 
could have tragic consequences. As noted earlier in the 
survey by Loftus and Loftus (1980) potential jurors may not 
be aware of the truly complex nature of memory. Some form 
of expert testimony or judge's instructions could have 
dramatic results in educating jurors as well as members of 
the judicial system about the fallible nature of human 
memory.
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Confidence
The confidence of an eyewitness has become one of the 
most important variables in eyewitness research. A number 
of studies have shown that subject-jurors are as likely to 
believe an inaccurate eyewitness as they are to believe an 
accurate eyewitness (Lindsay, Wells, and Rumpel, 1981; 
Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson, 1979; Wells, Lindsay, and 
Tousignant, 1980; Wells, Ferguson, and Lindsay, 1981). 
Furthermore, the confidence of the eyewitness is a primary 
determinant of his or her percieved credibility (Lindsay, 
Wells, and Rumpel, 1981; Wells, et. al., 1979; Wells, et. 
al., 1980). Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) found that 
eyewitness confidence highly correlated (r=.71) with the 
subject-jurors* belief of the eyewitness. According to 
Wells (1980), up to 50% of the variation in jurors' 
decisions regarding the believability of an eyewitness can 
be accounted for by eyewitness* confidence. Hastie (1980, 
cited in Wells, et. al., 1980) videotaped jury 
deliberations and subjected the videotapes to an analysis in 
which all remarks concerning eyewitness identifications were 
coded by judges. He found that most jurors assumed that 
high confidence on the part of the witness implied accuracy.
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Jurors do not stand alone in their reliance upon 
eyewitness confidence in evaluating witness credibility. 
The United States judiciary has formally designated 
confidence as a reliable cue to evaluating witness 
credibility in a major United States Supreme Court case 
(Neil vs. BiggerSy 1972).
However, despite the reliance of both jurors and judges 
on eyewitness confidence, research has not found confidence 
and eyewitness accuracy to be very highly related. Wells, 
et. al. (1979) suggest that over 90% of the variance in 
eyewitness confidence is determined by factors other than 
eyewitness accuracy. Eyewitness confidence has been shown 
to be modestly related to accuracy (Lipton, 1977; Wells, 
et. al., 1979), unrelated much of the time (Leippe, Wells, 
and Ostram, 1978) and negatively related at times (Loftus, 
Miller and Burns, 1978). Deffenbacher (1980) in a review of 
25 such studies, found that half of the studies noted a 
modest but positive correlation between confidence and 
accuracy, while half found correlations that were nil or 
negative. Deffenbacher (1980) contends that under "low 
optimal conditions", or those conditions which are not 
conducive to forming an accurate memory, the 
confidence-accuracy relationship is near zero. Lichenstein 
and Fischhoff (1977) found that there was no relationship 
between accuracy and confidence on a task that was novel.
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However, when subjects were familiar with the task, 
subjects' confidence was significantly related to accuracy. 
Wells, et. al. (1979) argue that criminal identification 
typically involves a novel experience in which a single 
exposure is followed in time by a recognition test. They 
therefore, suggest that such novel encounters will lead to a 
poor accuracy-confidence relationship. Leippe (1980) notes 
that the accuracy of one's memory can be influenced by 
reconstructive memory processes, while confidence in one's 
memory can be independently influenced by suggestive social 
influences, such that the correspondence between confidence 
and accuracy can range from high to low depending on the 
amount of external intrusion. Deffenbacher (1980) concludes 
that the judicial system should cease relying on eyewitness 
confidence as an index of eyewitness accuracy.
In another important finding for the judicial system. 
Wells, et. al. (1981) found that confidence in a false 
memory can be easily enhanced. Half of their eyewitnesses 
were "briefed" in a way in which an attorney might do with 
his or her witness. This included a simple instruction to 
rehearse the witnesses* account, sample questions that might 
be asked by a cross examiner, and warnings that the 
cross-examiner will look for inconsistencies in the 
testimony. They found that; (a) briefed eyewitnesses were 
judged by subject-jurors as more confident than non-briefed
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eyewitnesses; (b) there was a small confidence-accuracy 
correlation for non-briefed eyewitnesses, but no 
relationship for briefed eyewitnesses, and (c) greater 
belief was given to the testimony of the briefed 
eyewitnesses than to the non-briefed eyewitnesses and the 
percentages of guilty votes followed the same pattern. 
Briefed eyewitnesses rated themselves as more confident then 
did non-briefed witnesses, with the increase primarily due 
to inaccurate eyewitnesses increasing their confidence.
Techniques such as these are common in the legal system 
and, in fact, are openly advocated. A recent film for law 
enforcement officers is solely devoted to the importance of 
thorough witness preparation (Anderson, 1979, cited in 
Wells, et. al., 1981). These techniques may increase the 
confidence of inaccurate eyewitnesses with a subsequent 
effect of jurors overbelieving inaccurate eyewitnesses (as 
was noted in the Wells, et. al., 1981 study).
The recent evidence that jurors are strongly influenced 
by witness confidence and that confidence does not 
correspond with accuracy suggests a serious problem for the 
judicial system. These problems may be overcome by the use 
of expert witnesses or a standardized information package to 
be presented to jurors by the judge.
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Effects of. Expert Testimony
Four studies have thus far examined the effects of 
expert psychological testimony on jurors* decision (Hosch, 
Becky and McIntyre, 1980; Loftus, 1980b; Wells, et, al,, 
1980; Fox (Note 1), All four studies have found that 
subject-jurors are significantly influenced by expert 
psychological testimony regarding eyewitness identification,
Loftus (1980b) conducted two experiments in which 
written summaries of an assault case were presented to 
subject-jurors. Half of the subjects * summaries included 
expert psychological testimony, while half did not. She 
found that the expert testimony reduced the percentage of 
guilty verdicts from 57,5% to 39%, In her second study, 
six-person juries deliberated together to reach a verdict. 
She found that juries whose summaries included expert 
testimony convicted the defendant less frequently and spent 
much more time discussing the eyewitness accounts than did 
those juries whose summaries did not,
Hosch, Beck and McIntyre (1980) studied the effects of 
expert testimony on both community residents and college 
student juries, In the first phase of their experiment, 24 
community residents served as jurors. The jurors were led 
to believe that the case was real and all procedures were 
made as realistic as possible. During the second phase of
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the experiment 24 student jurors viewed a videotape of the 
same court-proceedings. All subjects viewed a burglery case 
in which the eyewitness identified the defendant as the 
criminal. Subsequently half of the subjects in each sample 
heard the expert testimony of a psychologist. Subjects who 
heard the expert testimony placed less importance on the 
eyewitness testimony in reaching their verdict, and spent 
more time in scrutinizing all evidence presented in the 
case. No significant differences were found between the 
community-resident juries and the college-student juries 
viewing the videotape.
Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant (1980) presented 
videotaped expert testimony to half of their subjects prior 
to their viewing of a videotaped cross-examination of an 
eyewitness. The eyewitnesses had previously seen a staged 
theft under poor, moderate, or good witnessing conditions 
and had been asked to make an identification. 
Subject-jurors viewed cross examinations of witnesses who 
were either accurate or inaccurate. Expert testimony 
reduced subjects* belief of accurate witnesses by 18% and 
inaccurate witnesses by 24%,
There is considerable agreement among psychologists in 
this area that expert testimony should not be directed 
toward the credibility of the particular eyewitness, but 
focused on providing knowledge of scientific results which
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the jurors should consider in weighing eyewitness testimony 
(Loftus, 1980b; Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre, 1980; Wells,
Lindsay and Tousignant, 1980 ; Woocher, 1977)• It is
generally agreed that psychologists should not offer post 
hoc probabilities of the likihood that a witness was 
accurate in a particular case. However, there has been some 
disagreement over how relevant the scientific information 
presented by the expert testimony should be to the 
particular case. Woocher (1977) has argued that expert
psychological testimony can furnish jurors with the
scientific information needed for a proper evaluation of the 
identification evidence by responding to the particular 
facts of a case. Both the Loftus (1980b) and Hosch et. al. 
(1980) studies followed this advice. In the Loftus (1980b) 
study, the expert testified on the relevant factors of 
cross-racial identification, stress, weapon focus, and 
alcohol. Hosch et. al. (1980) had the expert testify on 
the relevant factors of duration of the critical event, 
stress, and his opinion to a hypothetical question based on 
the facts in this case. Wells, et. al. (1980), on the 
other hand, has argued on behalf of a more general form of 
expert testimony, stating that specific or "relevant" 
testimony is too costly in terms of time and money. In the 
Wells, et. al. (1980) study the expert testimony consisted 
of the two general points that 15% - 85% of eyewitnesses may 
choose the wrong person from a lineup and that eyewitness
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confidence is an unreliable cue to an eyewitness' accuracy.
The only study to compare a more specific "relevant 
factors" expert testimony with a "general" expert testimony 
was done by Fox (Note 1). It is also the only study to 
manipulate the eyewitness confidence variable. Fox found 
that both types of expert testimony significantly reduced 
guilt ratings and the belief that the eyewitness correctly 
identified the gunman. He found that "relevant" testimony 
reduced guilt ratings and the belief that the eyewitness 
correctly identified the gunman more than "general" expert 
testimonyr although the differences did not attain 
statistical significance. Fox also found that both types of 
expert testimony significantly reduced subject-jurors * 
reliance upon eyewitness confidence as an indicator of 
accuracy, though it did not completely eliminate the 
tendency for subjects to believe the high confidence witness 
more than the low confidence witness.
It is apparent from the above studies that both 
"relevant" and "general" expert testimony can have a 
significant effect upon jurors* beliefs about the 
reliability and accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
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Expert Psychological Testimony v s . Judge's Instructions
Although the previously cited studies have shown expert 
psychological testimony to be effective in reducing jurors* 
overreliance upon eyewitness identifications, the courts 
have often rejected such testimony. They cite the fear that 
the expert * s impressive credentials may lead the jury to 
rely too heavily upon his opinion and to undervalue the 
weight of eyewitness testimony. They also contend that 
expert testimony can be quite costly financially as well as 
causing undue delay due to the presentation of extensive and 
merely cumulative evidence (Woocher, 1977). In order to 
correct against these arguments, it has been suggested that 
the court give special cautionary instructions concerning 
eyewitness testimony to the jury in cases in which 
eyewitness identifications are used. However, no study to 
date has examined the effects of instructions read to the 
jury by the judge concerning the unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications.
Several courts have adopted model jury instructions. 
The leading decision in this area has been United States v. 
Telfaire, 1972, in which instructions designed to focus the 
jury's attention on the identification issue were set forth. 
Although model instructions such as these have been hailed 
as a step in the right direction, they have been criticized 
as failing to provide the jury with information it can use
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in evaluating the reliability of a particular eyewitness.
Another criticism of special jury instructions has been 
the contention that the jury does not use information 
conveyed in such a manner. Although, as previously stated, 
no study has yet been done which examines the effectiveness 
of jury instructions concerning eyewitness identifications, 
there have been a number of studies done examining the 
effectiveness of other jury instructions. One study 
(Charrow and Charrow, 1978, cited in Loftus, 1979) found 
that judge's instructions tend to be long and tedious and 
are not adequately comprehended. In a study by Thompson, 
Fong, and Rosenhan (1981), it was concluded that jurors tend 
to decide cases according to their own standards of justice 
and are not much influenced by what the judge says. Critics 
contend that instructions are embedded in the middle of a 
long and difficult list of instructions in language that is 
generally foreign to the layperson and juror.
The present study will compare the effects of judge's 
instructions to psychological expert testimony and to a "no 
expert testimony " control condition following an eyewitness 
with either high or low confidence. The judge's 
instructions will only be in the realm of "general" expert 
testimony for two reasons. First, judges are not experts on 
the capacity of eyewitnesses and second, they are not 
supposed to comment upon the evidence itself, which they
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might be forced to do if they give "relevant" expert
testimony. In order to make the judge's instructions more 
viable and equivalent to the psychological expert testimony, 
the judge's instructions concerning eyewitness
identifications will be the only instructions heard on the 
videotape containing the judge. As was done in the Fox 
(Note 1), Loftus (1980b), and Hosch et. al. (1980)
studies, the expert testimony will be presented following 
the eyewitness testimony, as this is the procedure commonly 
followed in the courtroom.
It has been argued that judge's instructions may be as 
effective as "general" expert testimony by a psychologist,
but not as effective as "relevant" expert testimony because
with "relevant" expert testimony the psychologist can
respond to the particular facts of a case and furnish the
jurors with the particular scientific information
needed for a proper evaluation of the identification 
evidence. Therefore, the present study will compare judge's 
instructions to both "general" and "relevant" expert 
psychological testimony.
The goals of the present study are to determine if
judge's instructions are as effective as psychological 
expert testimony, and to replicate a previous expert
testimony study. These are significant goals because
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replication will increase the reliability and 
generalizability of the results of the previous expert 
testimony research. In addition, if the judge's 
instructions are found to be as effective as the 
psychological expert testimony, tremendous amounts of time 
and money can be saved in the legal system.
The eyewitness videotape and the psychologist 
videotapes will be the same as those used by Fox (Note 1) in 
his study. These tapes have been previously rated by 
subjects as highly realistic, and will constitute the first 
replication of an expert testimony study. This will also be 
the first study to compare judge's instructions with expert 
psychological testimony. While it has been argued that a 
psychologist's impressive credentials may lead the jury to 
rely too heavily upon his opinion, others have argued that 
due to the public reaction to trials such as John 
Hinckley's, the possibility arises that the jury may 
discount the testimony of the expert for the very reason 
that he is a psychologist (Woocher, 1977). It is 
hypothesized by the author that the psychological expert 
testimony will replicate the results found by Fox (Note 1), 
and in addition, that the judge's instructions will have as 
much impact on subject-juror's decisions as the "general" 
psychological testimony but not as much impact as the 
"relevant" testimony.
CHAPTER III 
METHODS
Design
The experimental conditions represent a 2 x 4 factorial 
design. The factor of "eyewitness confidence" during 
testimony consisted of two levels (high confidence vs. low 
confidence). The "expert testimony " variable had four 
levels (no expert testimony (control) condition, relevant 
factors expert testimony by a psychologist, general factors 
expert testimony by a psychologist, and general expert 
testimony by a judge)• Subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of the 8 conditions, with the constraint that at least 
14 subjects (8 female, 6 male) were assigned to each 
experimental condition.
S.utei,egJ-s
112 subjects (64 females, 48 males) were selected from 
the University of Montana introductory psychology class. 
Each subject received experimental credit for his/her 
participation in the study.
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Eyewitness Testimony Videotapes
Common Characteristics of Eyewitness Videotapes
The two eyewitness videotapes were the same as those 
used by Fox (Note 1). Both tapes concerned the robbery of a 
7-11 convenience store and the subsequent murder of a store 
clerk (See Appendices A and B ) • The eyewitness to the crime 
was the 7-11 store manager who was working in the back of 
the store when he heard a gunshot. Upon running to the 
front of the store he found two men emptying the cash 
register, another holding a gun, and his fellow employee 
lying on the floor. The gunman called to the other men to 
get out of the store and then took a shot at the witness 
which narrowly missed. The criminals ran down the street to 
a car parked out of sight. The eyewitness checked on the 
murdered clerk and then called the police and gave them a 
description of the crime and the gunman. One month later 
the eyewitness identified the defendant as the gunman in a 
one-on-one "showup" identification at police headquarters.
In both videotapes the eyewitness was initially 
interrogated by the prosecution. The prosecution questions 
were relatively simple and straightforward. Following the 
prosecution's questioning, the eyewitness was interrogated 
by the defense lawyer. The defense lawyer's questions were 
more challenging and confrontive and required the eyewitness
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to describe the crime in more explicit detail.
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Low Confidence Videotape (See Appendix, Section A)
In the low confidence videotape, the eyewitness was 
hesitant, unsure, and inconsistant in his testimony. The 
witness used a high number of verbal qualifiers ("I
think ”, "I guess...... ", "It must have b e e n ........")
which have been shown to portray low confidence (Wells and 
Lindsay, 1982) . The script for this videotape was also 
written to include frequent hesitation forms ("uh", "well", 
"you know") and questioning forms (the use of rising, 
questioning intonation in declarative contexts) which have 
been shown to produce a "powerless" speech style (Erickson, 
Lind, Johnson, and O' Barr, 1978).
High Confidence Videotape (See Appendix, Section B)
In the high confidence videotape, the eyewitness 
(portrayed by the same actor as in the low confidence 
videotape) was consistant, sure of himself and non-hesitant. 
He did not use verbal qualifiers, but instead expressed his 
confidence in his identification of the gunman by using 
phrases such as "I'm certain", "I'm sure", and "I could 
never forget".
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Expert Testimony Videotapes
General Expert Testimony bY a Psychologist (See 
Appendix, Section C)
This tape was the same as that used in the Fox (Note 1) 
study and was adopted from Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant 
(1980). The first half of the psychologist's testimony was 
in response to questioning by the defense lawyer, while the 
second half was in response to the prosecution's questions. 
Like the Wells, et. al. study (1980), two major points 
were made. The first general point was that eyewitness 
identification in criminal cases is different from 
recognizing one's friends, where repeated exposures serve to 
facilitate memory. Research using staged crimes has shown 
that, depending on the conditions, anywhere from 15% to 85% 
of the witnesses may choose a wrong person from a lineup. 
The second major point was that there is considerable 
evidence to show that the confidence of an eyewitness may 
have little or no relationship to the accuracy of the 
witness. Additionally basic memory processes and types of 
memory were discussed by the psychologist to aid the jurors 
in understanding how errors in eyewitness memory may occur. 
Finally, as in the Wells, et. al. study (1980), the expert 
summarized the above points and recommended that the juror 
focus on situational factors that may have facilitated or 
inhibited the accuracy of the eyewitness.
36
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony bv a Psychologist (See 
Appendix y Section D)
This videotape was again the same as used by Fox (Note 
1) in his study. In this tape the psychologist discussed 12 
specific factors affecting eyewitness perception and memory 
that were highly relevant to the case being tried. These 12 
factors consisted of the following;
1. "Physical" factors affecting eyewitness 
performance, such as lighting conditions, fast movements and 
the distance from the criminal,
2. Length of observation of the criminal,
3. Length of time between observation of a crime and
the recall of that observation,
4. Effects of stress,
5. Tendency of an eyewitness to overestimate the
duration of a crime,
6. "Weapon focus" - the distracting effects of the
presence of a weapon,
7. Number of criminals involved.
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8. Effects of a violent or emotionally loaded 
incident,
9. Uniqueness or distinctiveness of criminal's face,
10. "Unconscious transference" - a person seen in one
situation is confused with or recalled as a person seen in a
second situation,
11. Effects of a biased or "showup" lineup, and
12. Effects of police pressure on eyewitnesses.
Similar to the general expert testimony, the 
psychologist was first interrogated by the defense lawyer, 
followed by questions from the prosecution. The 
psychologist ended by summarizing the points made in the 
general testimony (except for the general discussion of 
memory) and by reviewing the 12 relevant factors listed 
above.
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Judge * s Instructions (See Appendix, Section E)
This tape was very similar to the general expert 
testimony by a psychologist videotape. The same actor who 
portrayed the psychologist portrayed the judge. One major 
difference between the two videotapes, besides the judge - 
psychologist differential, was the fact that the judge read 
his testimony in the form of instructions. He was not 
questioned by either the defense or prosecution as the 
psychologist was. Otherwise, the tapes were very similar, 
and all of the points covered by the psychologist in the 
general expert testimony videotape were stated by the judge.
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Dependent Measures (See Appendix, Section F)
Fourteen questions were employed as dependent measures. 
Subjects were first asked to indicate whether they believed 
the witness identified the actual gunman or an innocent 
person (Wells, Ferguson, and Lindsay, 1981). Subjects were 
subsequently asked to indicate (a) how confident they were 
of that decision on a 10-point Likert scale; (b) how 
confident they thought the witness was in his ability to 
identify the gunman; (c) what percentage of people they 
would expect to make a correct identification under the
circumstances described by the eyewitness; and (d) to what 
extent they believed they could generally tell from a 
witness' confidence in his testimony whether or not the 
eyewitness made an accurate identification (Wells, Lindsay, 
and Ferguson, 1979). The probability of the defendant's 
guilt was also rated on a 10-point Likert scale. Subjects 
were also asked to rate on Likert-type scales the percentage 
of eyewitness testimony in general they thought was accurate 
(Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre, 1980). Three additional
10-point Likert scale questions, adapted from Fox, 1982,
asked subjects to assess how much they relied upon the
eyewitness' description of the crime, the eyewitness* 
confidence, and the psychologist's or judge's expert 
testimony in deciding whether they thought the eyewitness 
had identified the gunman or an innocent person. (The
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question regarding expert testimony was not given to the two 
control conditions.) Two final Likert-scale questions asked 
subjects to rate the realism of the eyewitness videotape and 
the expert testimony videotape. (Again control subjects did 
not receive questions concerning the expert testimony 
videotape.) Subjects in the expert testimony by judge 
conditions were asked if they recognized the judge. 
Finally, in another question from Fox, 1982, subjects were 
asked to describe in their own words how they decided that 
the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent 
person.
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Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
experimental conditions at the time of the initial contact. 
Sessions were conducted at the Clinical Psychology Center at 
the University of Montana, with 14 subjects (8 female, 6 
male) assigned to each of the sessions. Each session was 
conducted by an undergraduate student in psychology who was 
blind to experimental hypotheses. Subjects first received a 
written introduction to the eyewitness videotape (See 
Appendix, Section G) stating the purpose of the study, 
general facts concerning the crime being tried, and 
important points made by the defendant who had testified 
previously. After subjects completed reading this brief 
introduction, they viewed one of the eyewitness testimony 
videotapes. Subjects in the two control conditions 
completed a cover sheet (age, sex, year in college) and the 
dependent measures following the eyewitness testimony 
videotape, since this videotape was the only one they saw. 
Participants in the expert testimony conditions were given, 
additionally, a written introduction to the expert testimony 
videotape (See Appendix, Sections H and I) describing the 
experience and expertise of the judge or testifying 
psychologist, depending upon which condition they were in. 
They then viewed this second videotape, after which they 
completed the cover sheet and the dependent measures. Each
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group of subjects was debriefed by the author at the 
completion of the experiment and thanked for their 
cooperation.
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Data Analysis
The Ullrich-Pitts computer program was used to compute 
analyses of variance. Analysis of variance were performed 
on the thirteen dependent measures employing Likert-type 
scales. If significant main effects were found for the 
expert testimony factor or if significant interaction 
effects were found, Newman-Keuls tests were subsequently 
performed, allowing for pairwise-comparisons among the 
cells. For the single dichotomous question, the gunman vs. 
innocent person decision, the chi-square test was performed. 
If significant results were found for the levels of expert 
testimony factor, then Bonferroni tests, which allow 
comparisons among individual cells involved in the 
chi-square test, were subsequently performed.
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS
Gunman v s ■ Innocent Person Decision
The percentage of subjects in each condition who 
believed the eyewitness accurately identified the gunman is 
portrayed in Table 1. 7.1% of the subjects in the control
conditions believed the eyewitness accurately chose the 
gunman, as compared to 7.1% of the subjects who heard the 
relevant psychological testimony, 21.4% of the subjects who 
heard the general psychological testimony, and 21.4% of the 
subjects who heard the judge's instructions. Thus, the 
majority of subjects in all conditions believed the 
eyewitness identified an innocent person. 12.5% of the 
subjects who viewed the high confident eyewitness believed 
the eyewitness accurately identified the gunman, compared to 
16% of the subjects who viewed the low confident eyewitness. 
No significant differences were found among any of the 
cells.
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Table 1 Percentage o f  Sub jec ts  in  Each C o n d i t ion  Who Be l ieved
Eyewitness A c c u r a te ly  Chose the  Gunman (n = 14 in  each cel 1)
High Low
Confidence Conf idence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
No Exper t  Test imony 7.1% 7.1%
Relevant Exper t Test imony 0 .0% 14.3%
General Exper t  Test imony 14.3% 28.6%
Judge 's  I n s t r u c t i o n s 28.6% 14.3%
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Decision Confidence
Subjects were asked to rate their confidence in their 
decision as to whether the eyewitness identified the gunman 
or an innocent person. Mean scores on a 10-point Likert 
scale for each of the eight individual groups are portrayed 
in Table 2. The higher the score, the greater the 
confidence indicated. The control groups' average 
confidence rating was 6.07, while the relevant expert 
testimony groups averaged 6.11, the general expert testimony 
groups averaged 6.11, and the judge's instructions groups 
averaged 6.29. The subjects in the high confidence 
conditions reported mean confidence ratings of 6.48, while 
subjects in the low confidence groups reported average 
ratings of 6.14. A 2 x 4 (eyewitness confidence by expert 
testimony ) analysis of variance revealed no significant 
differences among the cells. (See Table 3 for the anova.)
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Tab le  2 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  o f  
t h e i r  confidence in  t h e i r  gunman vs . innocent person d e c is io n ,
(10  •  a b s o lu te ly  c o n fid e n t)
Hi gh Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
flo Expert Testimony (C o n tro l) 6 .0 7 6 .0 7
R elevan t Psy. E xp ert Testimony 6 .6 4 5 .57
General Psy. E xp ert Testimony 6 .9 3 6 .6 4
Judge's In s tru c tio n s 6 ,2 9 6 .2 9
Tab le  3 2. x 4 - A n a lys is  o f  v a ria n c e  o f  ra t in g s  o f  confidence on the  
innocent person d e c is io n
gunman vs.
Source o f  Sum o f  
V a r ia t io n  Squares d f Mean Square F
S icn i f i  cancs 
o f r
Confidence (CF) 3 .2 2 I 3 .2 2 .32 .36
Expert Testimony (ET) 9 ,0 9 3 3 .03 .73 .31
CF X ET 5 .3 3 3 1 .79 .46
Residual 406.38 104 3.9T
T o ta l 424 .06 ITT 3 .32
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Guilt
Subjects were asked to rate the probability of the 
defendent*s guilt on a 10-point Likert scale (10 =
definitely guilty). Mean scores for each group are shown in 
Table 4. Subjects in the control groups gave average guilt 
ratings of 4.14, while those in the relevant expert 
testimony groups averaged 3.75, those in the general expert 
testimony groups averaged 4.32, and those who heard the 
judge's instructions averaged 3.72. Mean guilt rating 
scores for those subjects in the high confidence condition 
were 3.91, compared to mean scores of 4.05 for subjects in 
the low confidence conditions. A 2 x 4 (eyewitness 
confidence by expert testimony ) analysis of variance found 
no significant differences among the cells. (See Table 5 
for the anova.)
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Tab le  4 Mean 5 fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  o f  
the  p r o b a b il i ty  o f  the d e fe n d a n t's  q u i l t  (10 *  d e f in i t e ly  o u i l ty ) '
Hi gh Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewi tness
Mo Expert Testimony (C o n tro l) 4. 14 4 .14
R elevan t ^ s y . E xp ert Testimony 3 ,5 0  4 ,0 0
General Psy. Expert Testimony 4 .1 4  4 .5 0
Judge's In s tru c t io n s  3 .9 6  3 .5 7
Table- S 2 x 4  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  ra t in g s  o f  p r o b a b il i ty  o f  d e fe n d a n t's  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ g u i l t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source o f  
V a r ia t io n
Sum o f  
Squares Mean Square F
Signi 
o f !
Confidence (CF) . 57" 1 .57 .18 .67
Expert Testimony (ET) ■7.46 3 2 .49 .32 .49
CF X ET 2 .5 4 3 .38 .29 ,33
Residual 315.29 104 3.03
Tota l 325.96 111 2.94
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Manipulation Check ---- — - Eyewitness Confidence Ratings
Subjects were asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert 
scale how confident the eyewitness was in his ability to 
identify the gunman (10 = definitely confident)• Mean
scores for each group are displayed in Table 6. The 
eyewitness was rated as significantly more confident in the 
high confidence conditions (X = 9.25, n = 56) than in the 
low confidence conditions (X = 4.54, n = 56. A 2 x 4
(eyewitness confidence by expert testimony ) analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect for confidence, 
as expected £  (1, 104) = 139.99, p < .001. (See Table 7 for 
the anova.)
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T ab le  6 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra tin g s  o f  
th e  degree o f  confidence o f  the eyew itness (10 *  d e f in i t e ly  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ c o n f i d e n t ) ______ _______ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
High Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
Mo E xpert Testimony (C o n tro l) 9.71 3 .6 4
R elevant Psy. E xpert Testimony 3 .5 7  5 .00
General Psy. E xpert Testimony 9 .3 6  5 .0 7
Judge's In s tru c tio n s  9 .3 6  4 .4 3
T a b le  7 2 x 4  A n a lys is  o f  v a ria n c e  o f  eyew itness confidence ra t ings
Source o f Sum o f
V a r ia t io n Squares Ëf. Mean Square F
Confidence (CE) 622 .29 1 622 .29 139.99
E xp ert Testimony (ET) 4 .5 0 3 1 .50 .34
CF X ET 23 ,64 3 7 .3 9 1.77
Residual 462 .29 104 1 .15
To ta l 1112.71 111 10.02
Siqni ficanca
Q- -______
<.001
.30
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Estimated General Percentage o£ Correct Identifications
Subjects were asked to make Likert-type estimations of 
the percentage of people who would make a correct
identification under the circumstances described by the 
eyewitness, (See Table 8 for the means of the 8 individual 
groups.) Subjects in the high confidence condition estimated 
that 31% of the population would make a correct
identification under the given circumstances, as compared to 
an estimate of 30% in the low confidence conditions. A 2 x 
4 (eyewitness confidence by expert testimony ) analysis of 
variance found a significant main effect for expert 
testimony, £ (3, 104) = 3.26, p = .02. (See Table 9 for the 
anova.) Subsequent Neuman-Keuls pairwise comparisons found 
that the control groups' estimated percentage (X = 40%,
n=28) was significantly greater (p< .05) than estimated 
percentages in relevant expert testimony groups (X = 26%,
n=28), general expert testimony groups (X = 27%, n=28), or
judge's instructions groups (X = 29%, n=28).
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Table  8 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' L ik e r t - ty p e  es tim a tio n s  o f  the  
percentage o f  people- who would make a c o rre c t  Id e n t i f ic a t io n  
under th e  circum stances described  by the  eyew itness
High Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewi tness Eyewitness
No Expert Testimony (C o n tro l) 40% 40%
R elevant Psy. E xpert Testimony . 26% 262
General Psy. E xp ert Testimony 29% 25%
Judge's In s tru c tio n s  29% 29%
T a b le  9 2 x 4 A n a lys is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  es tim ated  general percentage o f
c o r re c t  id e n t i f ic a t io n s
Source o f  
V a r ia t io n
Sum o f  
Squares Mean Square F
Signi f i  canci 
o f  F
Confidence (CF) 14 .29 1 14 .29 .04 .34
E xpert Testimony (ET) 3446,43 3 1148.31 3.25 .0 2 -
CF X ET 73 .57 3 26 .19 .07 .97
Residual 36623 .57 104 352 .20
Total 40167 .36 111 361.37
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Belief in Eyewitness Confidence as an Indicator of Accuracy
Subjects were asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert 
scale to what extent you can tell from an eyewitness' 
confidence in his testimony whether or not the eyewitness 
made an accurate identification (10 = can almost always
tell)• Subjects in the high confidence conditions reported 
mean ratings of 4.14, while those in the low confidence 
conditions reported average ratings of 4.50. (See Table 10 
for the means of the 8 individual groups). A 2 x 4 analysis 
of variance (eyewitness confidence by expert testimony) 
revealed a significant main effect for expert testimony, £ 
(3, 104) = 3.56, p = .02. (See Table 11 for the anova.) A 
Neuman-Keuls analysis of this main effect indicated that the 
control groups gave significantly higher (p<.05) ratings to 
the belief that one can use confidence as an indicator of 
accuracy (Y=5.35, n=28) than subjects in the relevant expert 
testimony groups (X=3.92, n=28), general expert testimony
groups (X=3.78, n=28), and judge's instructions groups
(X=4.21, n=28).
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Tab le  10 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  
o f  the  e x te n t to  which eyew itn ess ’ con fidence can be used to 
in d ic a te  eyew itness accuracy (10  » can alm ost always use confidence  
to  p re d ic t  accuracy)
Hi gh Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewi tness Eyewitness
flo Expert Testimony (C o n tro l) 5 .1 4 5 .5 7
R elevan t Psy. E xpert Testimony 3 .6 4 4.21
General Psy. E xpert Testimony 3 .43 4 .1 4
Judge's In s tru c tio n s 4 .3 6 4 .0 7
T ab le  11 2 x 4  A n a lys is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  b e l i e f  in  eyew itness confidence as 
In d ic a to r  o f  accuracy
Source o f  Sum o f  
V a r ia t io n  Sgua res Mean Souare
S iq m 'fi canca 
F a f  F
Confidence (CF) 3 ,5 7 1 3 .5 7 .39 .55
Expert Testimony (ET) 42.71 3 1 4 .2 4  3 56 .02+
CF X ET 4 .1 4 3 1 .38 .35 ,30
Residual 416 .00 104 4 .0 0
To ta l 466 .43 m 4 .2 0
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Estimated General Percentage of Accurate Eyewitness 
Testimony
Subjects were asked to make Likert-type estimations of 
the general percentage of eyewitness testimony that is 
accurate. (See Table 12 for the means of the 8 individual 
groups). Subjects in the control conditions estimated that 
47% of eyewitness testimony is accurate, as compared to 
estimates of 43% in the relevant expert testimony groups, 
35% in the general expert testimony groups, and 45% in the 
judge's instructions groups. Subjects in the high 
confidence conditions indicated average estimates of 43.75%, 
while those in the low confidence conditions gave average 
estimates of 41.25%. A 2 x 4 (eyewitness confidence by 
expert testimony ) analysis of variance found no significant 
differences among the cells. (See Table 13 for the anova.)
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T ab le  12 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' L ik e r t - ty p e  e s tim a tio n s  o f  
th e  general percentage o f  accu ra te  eyew itness testim ony____
No E xpert Testimony (C o n tro l)  
R elevan t Psy. Expert Testimony 
General Psy. E xp ert Testimony 
Judge;*!. In s tru c tio n s
High
Confidence
Eyewitness
SOS
4 S Ï
34%
46%
Low
Confidence
Eyewitness
44%
41%
36%
44%
T a b le  13 2 x 4  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  es tim ated  general percentage o f
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ a c c u ra te  eyew itness  tes tim ony_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source o f  
V a r ia t i  on
Sum o f  
Squares d f Mean Souare F
S i an 1 f  1 c 
o f
Confidence (CF) 150 .39 1 150.39 . 38 .5*1
Expert Testimony (ET) 2266.96 3 755 .66 1 .92 . ' 3
CF X ET 231 .25 3 77 .08 .20 .90
Residual 40992 .36 104 394 . 15
Tota l 43641 .96 111 3 93 . 17
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Eyewitness' Description of the Crime as Basis of Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert 
scale how much they based their gunman vs, innocent person 
decision upon the eyewitness* description of the crime (10 = 
based decision largely upon eyewitness' description of the 
crime). Mean scores for each group are displayed in Table 
14. Subjects in the control groups gave an average basis of 
decision rating of 6.75, as compared to average ratings of 
5.28 for the relevant expert testimony groups, 5.53 for the 
general expert testimony groups, and 6.28 for the judge's 
instructions groups. Mean basis of decision ratings for 
those subjects in the high confidence conditions were 5.89, 
compared to mean scores of 6.04 for subjects in the low 
confidence conditions. A 2 x 4 (eyewitness confidence by 
expert testimony ) analysis of variance revealed a 
significant main effect for expert testimony, F, (3,104) =
2.75, £=.046. (See Table 15 for the anova.) Subsequent
Neuman-Keuls analysis revealed no significant differences 
among any of the pairwise comparisons.
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T ab le  14 Means fo r  each group on su b je c ts * 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra tin g s  o f  
how much th ey  based t h e i r  gunman vs . innocent person d e c is io n  upon 
the  eyew itness* d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the  crim e (10  *  based d e c is io n  
la r g e ly  uoon eyew itness* d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the crim e)
Hi gh Low
Confi dence Con fid e n  ca
Eyewitness Eyewitness
Mo E xp ert Testimony (C o n tro l) 6 ,3 3  7 .1 4
R e levan t Psy. E xpert Testimony 5 .1 4  5 .43
General Psy. E xp ert Testimony S .7 Î  5 .36
Judge's In s tru c tio n s  5 .3 6  5.21
Table  15 Z x 4̂  A n a ly s is  o f  V a rian ce  o f  D e s c rip tio n  o f'C rim e  as Basis o f  
D ecis ion
Source o f  
V a r ia t io n
Sum o f  
Squares Mean Souare F
Signi fic a n c a  
o f  F
Confidence (CF) .57 1 .5 7 .12 .73
E xpert Testimony (ET) 38 .21 3 12.74 2 .75 .0 4 5 *
CF X ET 5 .3 6 3 1 .79 .39
Residual 451 .71 104 4 .53
Total 525 .86 111 1 .74
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Eyewitness' Confidence as Basis of Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert 
scale how much they based their gunman vs. innocent person 
decision upon the eyewitness* confidence in his testimony 
(10 = based decision largely upon the eyewitness'
confidence) A 2 x 4 (eyewitness confidence by expert 
testimony ) analysis of variance revealed a significant main 
effect for confidence, F (1, 104) = 13.55, p<.001. (See
Table 16 for the means of the 8 individual groups and Table 
17 for the anova.) Subjects in the low confidence conditions 
reported basing their gunman vs. innocent person decision 
upon eyewitness confidence significantly more (X*=5.55, n=56) 
than subjects in the high confidence conditions (X=4.02, 
n=56) .
The main effect for expert testimony was also 
significant, £, (3, 104) = 6.76, £<.001. Subsequent
Neuman-Keuls comparisons indicated that this effect was due 
to the control groups basing their decision upon the 
eyewitness* confidence significantly more (£<.05) (X=6.21,
n=28) than relevant expert testimony groups (X=3.86, n=28), 
general expert testimony groups (X=4.04, n=28), or judge's 
instructions groups (X=5.04, n=28).
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T ab le  16 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  
o f  how.much th ey  based t h e i r  gunman v s . innocent person d ec is io n  
upon Lhe eyew itn ess ' confidence in  h is  testim ony (10 » based 
d e c is io n  la ro e T y  upon th e  eyew itness ' co n fid en ce)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
High Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewitness E y e w i tness
*lo E xpert Testimony (C o n tro l) 4 .71 7.71
R elevan t Psy. E xpert Testimony 3 .1 4  4 .57
General Psy. E xpert Testimony 3 .7 9  4 .2 9
Judge's In s tru c t io n s . 4 .4 3  5 .6 4
T a b le  17 2 x 4  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  eyew itness confidence as basis o f
d e c is io n
Source o f  
V a r ia t i  on
Sum o f  
Squares It Mean Souare F S ig n i- i  canca o f -
Confidence (CF) 6 6 .0 4 Î 66 .04 13.55 <.3QT
E xp ert Testimony (ET) 98 .7 9 3 32.93 6.76 <.301
CF X ET 23 .32 3 7 .77 1.50 .  ̂9
Residual 506.71 104 4 .3 7
To ta l 594.36 TTl 5 .2 5
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Realism Ratings of Eyewitness Testimony
Subjects were asked to rate their agreement on a 
10-point Likert scale with the statement, "The film 
presented a realistic example of an eyewitness testimony 
(10 = strongly agree) Mean realism ratings were adequately
high across all groups (overall mean = 7.29, n=112) and are 
displayed in Table 18. A 2 x 4 (eyewitness confidence by 
expert testimony ) analysis of variance of subjects' ratings 
of realism revealed no significant differences among any of 
the cells. (See Table 19 for the anova.)
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T a b le  13 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  
o f  t h e i r  agreement w ith  th e  statem ent th a t  the f i lm  presented a 
r e a l i s t i c  example o f  an eyew itness testim ony (10 « s tro n g ly  agree
No E xpert Testimony (C o n tro l) 
R elevant Psy. E xpert Testimony 
General Psy. E xpert Testimony 
Judge's In s tru c tio n s
High
Confidence
Eyewitness
8.21
3 .0 0  
T.21
7 .0 0
Low
Confidence
Eyewitness
5.21
7.21  
7 .36  
6 .6 4
T a b le  19 2 x 4  A n a lys is  o f  v a ria n c e  o f  eyew itness testim ony rea lism
_________ ra t in g s  f o r  in d iv id u a l grouos_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source o f  
V a r ia t io n
Sum o f  
Squares É L Mean Souare F
Signi canc 
p f -
Confidence (CF) 1 0 .9 4 1 10.94 2 .57 .108
Expert Testimony (ET) TO.31 3 3 .5 0 .35 .525
CF X ET 2 5 .1 7 3 3 .3 9 1.97 / 2 1
Residual 442 .36 104 4 .25
Total 439 .23 in 4.11
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Expert Testimony as a Basis of Decision
Subjects in the six expert testimony groups were asked 
to indicate how much they based their gunman vs. innocent 
person decision upon the expert testimony. A 10-point 
Likert scale was used (10 = based decision largely upon the 
expert testimony ). Subjects in the relevant expert 
testimony groups gave mean basis of decision ratings of 
6.89, compared to average ratings of 6.67 in the general 
expert testimony groups, and 6.60 in the judge's 
instructions groups. A 2 x 3 (eyewitness confidence by 
expert testimony ) analysis of variance found a significant 
main effect for confidence, £, (1,78) = 6.64, p=.01. (See
Table 20 for the means of the six individual groups and 
Table 21 for the anova.) Subjects in the high confidence 
conditions reported basing their decision upon the expert 
testimony significantly more (X=7.38, n=42) than subjects in 
the low confidence conditions (X=6.07, n=42).
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Tab le  20 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ' 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra tin g s  
o f  how much they based t h e i r  gunman v s . innocent person d ec is io n  
upon the e xp ert tes tim o n y  (10 » based d e c is io n  la r g e ly  upon the  
e x p e rt tes tim o n y)
High Low
Confidence Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
Mo E xpert Testimony (C o n tro l) ™  —
R elevan t Psy. Expert Testimony 8 .2 9  5 .5 0
General Psy. Expert Testimony ’7 .1 4  5 .21
Judge's In s tru c tio n s  5 .71 5.50-
Tab le  21 2 x 3  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  e x p e rt testim ony as basis  o f
d e c is io n  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source^ o f  
V a r ia t io n
Sum o f  
Squares Ê t Mean Souare F
S ig n if ic a  
o f F
Confidence (CF) 36.01 1 35.01 5 .5 4 .3 1 *
Expert Testimony (ET) 1 .2 4 2 .62 .11 .39
CF X ET 2 4 .5 7 2 12.33 2 .2 7
Residual 442 .79 78 5 .42
Tota l 484 .70 33
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Realism Ratings of Expert Testimony
Subjects in the six expert testimony groups were asked 
to indicate on a 10-point Likert scale their agreement with 
the following statement, "The film presented a realistic 
example of a psychologist or judge giving testimony on 
research in the area of eyewitness testimony (10 =
strongly agree) Mean realism ratings for all six groups were 
adequately high (overall mean = 7.54, n=84) and are
presented in Table 22. A 2 x 3 (eyewitness confidence by 
expert testimony ) analysis of variance of subjects' ratings 
of realism found no significant differences among any of the 
cells. (See Table 23 for the anova.)
67
T a b le  22 Means fo r  each group on s u b je c ts ’ 1 0 -p o in t L ik e r t  sca le  ra t in g s  
o f  t h e i r  agreem ent w ith  the  s tatem ent t h a t  the f i lm  presented a 
r e a l i s t i c  example o f  a p s ych o lo g is t o r judge g iv in g  ex p e rt  
testim ony (10 *  s tro n g ly  ag ree )
High Low
Confidence  ̂ Confidence
Eyewitness ’ Eyewitness
Mo Expert Testimony (C o n tro l)  . . . .  . . . .
R elevant Psy. E xp ert Testimony 8 .0 7  7.71
General Psy. E xp ert Testimony 7 .3 6  7 .5 7
Judge’ s In s tru c tio n s  6 .5 0  3 .0 0
T a b le  23 2 x 3  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r ia n c e  o f  e x p e rt testim ony re a lis m  ra tin g s  fo r
_________ in d iv id u a l groups_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source o f  
V a r ia t io n
Eufli o f^  
Souares d f Mean Souare F
S ig n if ie s  
c f  F
Confidence (CF) 4 .2 9 1 4 .2 9 .92 . 55
E xpert Testimony (ET) 5 .0 0 2 3 .0 0 .53 .53
CF X ET 12 .67 2 5 .3 3 1,35 . 25
Residual 365 .93 73 4 .6 9
To ta l 333 .39 83
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION
No significant differences were found among any of the
groups on the gunman vs* innocent person decision. The
majority of subjects in all conditions believed the
eyewitness identified an innocent person, thus failing to
replicate the findings of Fox (Note 1). This lack of
replication appears to be a significant finding in and of
itself. The current study was the first known attempt to
replicate the findings of any of the four studies that have
thus far examined the effects of expert testimony on jurors'
decisions. This study was methodologically equal to the Fox
(Note 1) study. The exact same eyewitness videotapes,
expert psychological videotapes, subject instructions and
dependent measures were used. Therefore, the difference in
findings may very well be related to sampling variability.
However, subjects in both experiments were students in
introductory psychology classes, the only difference being
that the present study was run during the beginning of fall
quarter as opposed to the middle of spring quarter for the
Fox (Note 1) study. No known historical events which may
have altered subjects' knowledge or perceptions of
eyewitness testimony occurred between the running of the two
experiments. An examination of control subjects' reasons
for deciding that the eyewitness had identified an innocent
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person failed to highlight any one particular cause for the 
discrepancy. Among the 28 control subjects, eight listed 
pressure as a reason for disbelieving the eyewitness, five 
cited a person's poor memory over time, nine made note of 
the gunman's average looks, fifteen listed the eyewitness' 
confidence as a factor, five stated that an eyewitness would 
look at the gun and not the face (weapon focus), four 
pointed out the concept of unconscious transference, though 
not by name, and four cited stress and fear as a factor. It 
is interesting to note that all of these factors were 
pointed out in the expert testimony conditions. However, 
the control subjects were able to identify these factors as 
significantly affecting eyewitness testimony without the aid 
of expert testimony.
This finding has both important applied and research 
implications. It may very well be the case that jurors are 
not lacking in the information supplied by expert testimony. 
An alternative, and more likely explanation of the results, 
is that some jurors may be lacking in the information 
supplied by expert testimony while others are not. It may 
also be that jurors are lacking in some of the information 
provided by expert testimony but, at the same time, are very 
knowledgeable of other portions of the testimony. Loftus 
(1979) has begun to investigate what knowledge the layman 
has of variables affecting eyewitness memory, but much more
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research in this area is needed. Research examining 
subject-juror variables^ such as age, sex, education, race, 
occupation, SES, intelligence, religion, etc., which may 
affect decision making regarding eyewitness testimony is 
also needed. The identification of particular subject-juror 
variables which could account for the discrepant findings 
could have tremendous impact on future jury selection in 
cases involving eyewitness testimony. It may be possible to 
establish a juror profile which would result in the 
selection of jurors who are highly knowledgeable about the 
variables affecting eyewitness memory. Psychologists could 
be called upon by the legal system to aid in the selection 
of jurors which match those profiles.
Despite the fact that all eight groups overwhelmingly 
found the defendant innocent, a number of significant 
differences were obtained on other measures. Relevant 
psychological testimony, general psychological testimony, 
and judge's instructions all significantly reduced estimates 
of the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony 
as compared to control groups. Further, subjects in all 
three expert testimony conditions were significantly less 
likely to believe that one can use confidence as an 
indicator of accuracy than subjects in control groups. 
Subjects in the control condition were also significantly 
more likely to base their decision of guilt vs. innocence
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upon the eyewitness* confidence than subjects in all three 
expert testimony conditions. No other significant 
differences were found between any of the expert testimony 
conditions and the control groups.
Because the majority of subjects in all eight groups 
found the defendant innocent, it is difficult to compare 
differences among the three types of expert testimony. 
However, on those measures, cited above, in which 
significant differences did occur, the three forms of expert 
testimony did not differ significantly from one another. 
Psychological testimony had greater impact than the judge's 
instructions on all three of the above mentioned measures, 
but this difference did not attain statistical significance. 
These preliminary findings offer support to the use of 
judge's instructions as a method of conveying research 
information concerning eyewitness testimony. It appears as 
though the credentials of a judge versus psychologiist as 
purveyor of psychological research to jurors is not a 
variable which significantly detracts from the information 
given. Jurors were just as willing to use the expert 
testimony of the judge as they were the psychologist. This 
finding again offers significant implications to the legal 
system. As previously reported, many members of the legal 
system have rejected expert psychological testimony on the 
grounds that it is too expensive, may cause undue delays.
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and may be overly influential due to the psychologist's 
impressive credentials. The current findings may help to 
circumvent these arguments by providing support for the use 
of judge's instructions. Not only would this save time and 
moneyr but the much needed psychological research findings 
on eyewitness memory could find their way into courts that 
are currently rejecting psychological expert testimony.
However, much more research is needed before the exact
impact of judge's instructions can be determined. Future 
research, in which control subjects base their decision upon 
the eyewitness testimony and find the defendant guilty, is 
needed to determine the relative degree of impact of judge's 
instructions vs. psychological expert testimony.
The hypothesis that relevant expert testimony would 
have greater impact then both the general expert testimony 
and the judge's instructions was not supported. This again 
may be due to the failure to find differences among any of 
the eight groups on the gunman vs. innocent person 
decision. Future research which utilizes a dismantling 
strategy and investigates one or two of the factors 
affecting eyewitness accuracy at a time would be helpful. 
It could be determined if relevant expert testimony might be 
more beneficial in some cases which contain particular 
factors. The current results support the notion that simply
bringing to the attention of the juror general information
73
concerning the unreliability of eyewitness memory and the 
failure of eyewitness confidence to predict accuracy is 
helpful.
As was previously noted, the psychologist's expert 
testimony did not have a significantly greater impact than 
the judge's instructions. However, it should also be 
pointed out that the psychological expert testimony was no 
less impactful than the judge's instructions. This would
tend to refute those who argue that because of the public 
exposure of the Hinckley case and others, juries will tend 
to discount the expert testimony of a psychologist.
Subjects in the low confidence conditions reported 
basing their gunman vs. innocent person decision upon 
eyewitness confidence significantly more than subjects in 
the high confidence conditions. This was not surprising 
considering that the majority of subjects found the
defendant innocent. Those subjects who viewed the low 
confidence eyewitness were more likely to utilize the lack 
of confidence as support for their innocence decision.
The manipulation check indicated that the high
confidence eyewitness was perceived by subjects as 
significantly more confident than the low confidence 
eyewitness. In addition, realism ratings indicated that 
subjects viewed both the examples of eyewitness testimony
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and expert testimony with which they were provided as 
believable. This again increases the liklihood that the 
discrepant results were not due to experimental 
manipulations but instead to subject variability.
The importance of replication in scientific research 
cannot be overemphasized (Kazdin, 1980). Unfortunately, 
however, replications are seldom attempted or at least are 
seldom reported in the literature. As Kazdin, 1980, points 
out, there are few professional rewards for replication 
attempts. If the original results are successfully 
replicated, the replication is met with indifference because 
it fails to provide new information to the literature. On 
the other hand, if the replication fails to yield the same 
results, the onus is upon the replicator to explain and 
demonstrate why there is a difference across studies. 
Replications are needed as direct tests of the reliability 
and generality of the original experimental relationship. 
As has been previously pointed out, this study marks the 
first known attempt at replicating the findings of any of 
the four studies that have thus far examined the effects of 
expert testimony. The fact that the results were not 
replicated does, indeed, call into question the reliability 
and generality of the original findings of Fox (Note 1). 
This study also points out the need for replication studies 
of the three previous expert testimony investigations
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(Hosch, Beck and McIntyre, 1980; Loftus, 1980; Wells, 
Lindsey, and Tousignant, 1980). It may be the case that 
replications of the aforementioned studies have been 
attempted but not reported. It has previously been found 
that given investigators or journals may report only 
"positive effects" and systematically exclude all similar
studies finding no differences (Greenwald, 1975). If
replications were done which failed to yield similar 
positive results, they may have gone unreported. The nature 
of publication practices undoubtedly fosters biases about 
the information disseminated in the literature. Thus, 
original studies of the effects of expert testimony (as well 
as replication studies) which failed to achieve significant 
results, may have been completed but gone unreported. The
current findings may be unique only when compared to those
findings which have been published.
Limitations of the present investigation include the 
brevity of eyewitness and expert testimony in comparison to 
actual court cases. Jurors in actual court cases often have 
the opportunity to see both the eyewitness and the 
psychological expert questioned and cross-examined for 
longer periods of time. Judge's instructions would be more 
likely embedded in a longer list of instructions to jurors. 
The fact that subjects knew this was a simulation rather 
than an actual case also reduces the external validity of
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the study. Additionally, as previously noted, subject 
variables may play an important role in determining the 
results of expert testimony research. The use of a college 
population may limit the generalizability of the results to 
an actual jury population.
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Summary
The majority of subjects in all conditions found the 
defendant to be innocent^ thus failing to replicate the 
results of Fox (Note 1)• On those measures in which 
significant results were obtained, the three forms of expert 
testimony did not differ from one another. Thus, 
preliminary findings support the use of judge's instructions 
to convey psychological research concerning eyewitness 
memory. Future research is needed to determine exactly what 
knowledge the layman has of variables affecting eyewitness 
memory. Studies are also needed which control for subject 
variables to determine exactly which variables account for 
the differences in potential jurors' knowledge of eyewitness 
memory. Further replications of expert testimony research 
are also needed to determine the reliability and 
generalizability of the results found thus far. As is so 
often the case, the present investigation seems to have 
raised more questions than it has answered.
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SECTION A
LOW CONFIDENCE EYEWITNESS TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction - (read to subjects by blind experimental assistant) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of the videotape of the trial, the 
prosecuting attorney asked the eyewitness to state his name and 
occupation,"
Prosecution
Witness: My name is, ah, Roy Wilkins, Ah - I*m the manager cf the
7-11 store.
Prosecutor: Describe in your own words what happened the night of
November 14, 1981,
W: Well, I was - I was in the back of the store, ah, urn, working,
Larry, that * s Larry Gelbert, was out front at - at the register.
Ah, business was slow that night and I*d gone back to get some 
stock for the shelves, ah, just to keep busy, you see.
P: And what time was this?
W: Ummm  let’s see, oh, it must have been pretty close to 11:30,
I’d say,
P: And what happened then?
W: Well, I - first I thought I heard somebody talking - talking kind
of loud out front, it ah - it sounded to me as if maybe Lairy ;ras in 
an argument with somebody, and so I - I decided to go out and - 
and see what was —  what was going on. About the time I thought I 
should go on out, ah, it seems that - well there was a loud 
noise. Ah, at first I thought maybe it was a gunshot, ah - ah 
I wasn't - I wasn't sure. But anyway, I - I quick ran to the - 
to the front of the store, and it seemed to me that - that they 
were - that they were emptying - emptying the till. And ah, there 
was - there was another man, I was pretty sure he was holding a gun. 
Um, I looked around and - and there was Larry, Larr}'" was lying on 
the floor. Ah, ah, I don't recall, I think maybe he - he wasn't 
moving. Ah, ah, an}"way the whole scene, ah, startled me. I um,
Iv- I ĝ Jsss, and - and when this man +ham I - I thought was holding 
the gun saw me, he aia - he called to the other two f eJ lows to get
out of the store. And ah - end then he took a shot at me, And
it must have - it must have gone into the wall behind me.
P: And how long did all this take;
W: Oh, I - I don't know, I - I suppose a - maybe about a minute.
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P: How did they get away:
W: Well,,,.let*s see. If I*m not mistaken ah - ah, the twc -
the two with the money raji off first. Yes, they - they, they ran
off first. Ah, this man that was, ah, holding the gun, ah, he must 
- he must have left last. I noticed - I believe he stumbled, just 
as he went - yes, I think he did, he stumbled as he went through the 
door, I sau him - I saw him get up, and then he ran on down the 
street, ah, with tiie other two. And, ah, a little while later, it
was, oh I suppose a matter of a few seconds I - I saw - ah, I
heard a car squeal out,
P; Did you see this car?
W: No, ah - no. I - I guess - I guess it must have been aro’und the
corner. Ah, yes it was around the comer, out of sight,
P: And what did you do then?
W: Well,,,.when I um, ah, when I saw them run down the street
um, I - I hurried back to check on Larry, to see if he was um, if 
■he was all right. And ah, um - well, I - I realised he was dead.
I - I must have, I must have called the police next. And then 
when they came down I, I called the ambulance, the amb^ulance cairie 
and - and, ah, took Larry away. And ah - I guess I gave them a 
description at that time cf what had happened - what I saw,
P: How old would you say they were?
W: Well, they were probably, ah, probably pretty young, ah,... I'd
say, oh, nineteen, maybe 2^ years old, maybe,
P; And what were they wearing.
W: Well, if I recall right, um.......the one, um, the one with the
gun, um, I think he was wearing a long, brown, sort cf a hea\y coat. 
One of the others had on a jacket, 'um, it must have been a clue ski 
jacket, Mid, um, the other was - was wearing a green coat. Yes, 
that was,...he was wearing a green coat, I - I think they all had -- 
had jeans jeans on,
P; Did you get a good look at their faces?
W; Well, I - I guess so. At least, um, I got a good lock at the 
face, um, of the man with the gun. Um, the other two, they seemed 
to have their backs to me much - much of the time.
P; ftliat wore the lighting conditions like, ;̂as there enough light 
to see them?
W : Well, 'Cm, probably, I - I, think so .... we had the...we had the
regular store lights on.
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P: Have you positively identified a suspect as being the per­
son with the gun vrho comrnltted armed robbery and first degree
murder that night?
W ; Well I - I believe so.
P: Describe this identification for the court.
W: Well, un, you see when the police called me, ah, they said I
should come down. That they, ah, they had a suspect, that, ah, fitted 
the description, ah, that I had, that I had given them. And sc I 
went down, um they had him in a cell, ’um, he was all by him­
self. And ah - ah, I locked at the man, ah, for awhile and, and I 
was pretty sure he was the man. And so I - I told the police that 
ah - he must be the right man.
P: And was that man the defendant?
W: Yes, sir.
90Introduction —  (read to subjects by blind e:\perinental assistant) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of videotape cf she trial, the de­
fending attorney noted that the eyewitness stated earlier that all 
of what he saw happened in about a minute. He then ashed the eye­
witness how much of this time the eyewitness estimated that he spent 
looking at the gunman's face."
Defense
Defense Attorney: You stated earlier that all of what you saw
happened in "about a minute". How much of this time would you
estimate that you spent looking at the gunman's face?
Witness: Well, I - I would say, um, I - I would say about thirty
seconds. Um...yes - yes it was about thirty seconds.
D: .^e you saying you managed to look at his face for a half min­
ute while he fired a shot at you?
W: Well, um... I guess I was so amazed at what was happening, um..,.
just like I said I - um...I just stopped dead in my cracks. And 
ah...I giuess he missed me because, he must have been moving, I 
think he was moving, trying to get out of the store all the time, see?
D: When he raised the gun to take a shot at you did you try to
move out of the way?
W: Well, he raised it so quickly I - I guess I didn't have time to
react, I -- I didn't have time to get out of the way, um, I did
jump, I must have jumped when he - when he shot the gun. It-it 
scared the life out of me. Why, I'”e just never been in arythirg 
like that before.
D: Was he moving all the :-mile that you saw him?
W: Yes....umm...well, I - I think he was, I - I*m pretty sure and -
and I guess that's when I got a - a pretty good look at his face.
D: Whiere were you looking during the other thirty seconds, when y:u
weren't looking at the giunman's face?
W: Well, ah... at Larry. Um, he was in bad shape there, lying cn the
floor.
D: Well, are you sure that you didn't spend more than half the
time looking at Larry?
W: Ah,.,let me think, ah,., you sec, when I - when I first came
out from the back of the store I, I guess I was looking mainly at 
Larry. But then when I realized what was happening, I spent m.cst
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of the rezt of the time looking at the robhero, you see. And, ah. . 
when this - when this one nan raised the ĝ un to shoot at me, tiiat 
really drew my attention and, I must have locked at him the rest of 
the time.
D: You say it was the gun that drew your attention?
W: Well, yes, I ah... I - T really couldn't believe what was 
happening, A:id when he raised the gun I was so stunned I - well 
I could hardly take my eyes off of it,
D: How far away was he standing from you?
W: Hmm... I'd say, ah,...oh, just about thirty feex.
D: Are you sure it wasn't 35 foet, let's say, or feet?
W: Well, um....well, I.... I don't know, um...,I think it was
about thirty feet,
D: When you made the identification at the police station, how
long was that after the crime?
W: About a month.
2: Do you feel that you had a good enough look at the criminal's
facE during all the excitement to be able to identify him a month 
later?
Wî Well, I- I - I think so,
D: Wlien you went down to the police station to make the identifica­
tion, did the police say anything to you before showing you the sus­
pect?
W: Well, let's see, um....the sergeant told me that, they had a -
a suspect that fitted the description that I gave them. And, um, 
he said that they were prexty sure that this was the man they were 
looking for.
D ; Did he say anything else to you?
Wi Well... let me.,.he dijsay that, ah, this had been a tough case 
for them, and that, um, they were going to be mighty glad xo ho.ve 
it closed and off the bocks,
Cî ; Was there anything distincxive or uriusual about the defendanx's 
face that helped you identify him?
92W: No..*.I,...I just rememberei what he looked like.
D: Well, what would you say were the features you relied upon
to identify him?
W: Oh, probably his brown hair, and his average build and - and
height, and ah, well, just the - just the look on his face, I 
guess,
D; Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the criminal 
rather than merely resembling the criminal?
W; Well I....I'm pretty certain.
D: Mr, Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify earlier that
he shopped in your store two or three times during the two or three 
months previous to the crime?
W: Yes, yes I did, that,
D : Well, is it possible that you identified the defendant because
you remember seeing him in your store before and he just happens 
to resemble the actual criminal?
W: No, I,..,I probably wouidn*t do that, I,..,Urn,..I don't think so,
no, I,.,.I probably wculdn't do that.
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SECTION B
HIGH CONFIDENCE EYEWITNESS TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction —  (read to subjects by blind experimental assistant)
- "At the beginning of this portion of the vi.dectape of the trial, 
the prosecuting attorney asked the eyewitness to state his name 
and occupation,"
Prosecution
Witness; My name is Roy Wilkins, W-I-L-K-I-N-S. I'm the manager of 
the 7-11 store.
Prosecutor: Describe in your own words what happened the night of
November 14, I98I.
W: Well, I was in the back of the store working. larr^r, Larry
Gelbart, was out front at the register. Business was slow that 
night and I'd gone back to get some stock for the shelves, just 
to keep busy.
What time was this?
It was ah, it was 11:30 at night, 
And what happen^ed then?
P 
W 
P
W: Well, I heard someone tallying loud out front. Sounded as if
Larry was having an -argument with somebody. So I decided to go eux
and see what was going on. Well, as scon as I decided to go out, I
heard a shot, a gunshot. Wall, I quick ran to the front of the store, 
I saw two robbers at the counter emptying the till. There was a 
third one standing there holding a gun. Larry was over here (ges­
tures) lying on the floor, he v.-asn't moving. Well, I was sc roared 
I - I stopped dead in my tracks, iind when the one holding the gun 
saw me he yelled to the other two to get out of the store right 
away. And he raised the gun, took a shot at me, it wont into the 
wall,
P: And how long did all this take?
W: Just about a minute.
P; How did they get away?
W: Well, the two with the money, ran out first - the one wish the
gun left last, he stumbled just as he went to the doer. He got up
and ran cut into the street with the other two. And a cou.'le of
seconds later I heard a car squeal out,
P: Did you see the car?
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W; No, it was around the comer, it was out of sight.
P: And what did you do then?
W: Well, when I saw them run down the street I hurried back
to check on Larry, to see that he - to see if he was still alive. 
He was dead. And so I - I called the police, they came down, 
the ambulance took Larr}- away. I gave them a complete descrip­
tion of what I saw.
P: Now how old would you say they are?
W: Well, they were young, 19, 24 years of age.
P; And what were they wearing?
W; Well, the one holding the gan was wearing a long brown heavy 
coat. And one of the others had on a blue ski jacket. The other, 
a green coat. All of them were wearing jeans.
P: Did you get a good look at their faces?
W: I got a good look at the face of the one with the gun. The
other two had their backs to me most of the time.
P: What were the lighting conditions like - was there enough
light to see?
Wî Oh, yes, we had the reg’jlar store lights on.
PI Have you positively identified a suspect as being the person
with the gun who committed armed robbery and first degree murder
that night?
V: Yes, yes,
P: Describe this identification ior the court.
W: Well, the police called me, asked me to come down, they said
they had a suspect, so I went down, and thyy had him in a cell,
all by himself. And as soon as I saw hLm, I knew he was the m.ai'i.
I told the police they had the right man.
Pi Was that the defendant?
W i Yes.
P : Thank you Mr. Wilkins, 1 have no other questions.
96Introduction —  (read to subjects by blind e:crerimental assistant) 
"At the beginning of this portion of videotape of the trial, the 
defending attorney noted that the eyewitness stated earlier that 
all of what he saw happened in about a ninute. He then asked the
eyewitness how much of this time the eyewitness estimated that he
spent lootiing at the gunman's face."
Defense
Defense Attorney: How much of this time would you estimate that
you spent looking at the gunman's face?
Witness: About thirty seconds,
D : Are you saying then, that you managed to look at his face for
a half minute while he fired a. shot at you?
W: I was so amased at what was going on, just like I said I
stopped dead in my tracks. And he missed me because he was 
mc/ing trying to get out of the store as soon as he could.
D: When he raised the gun to take a shot at you, did you try to
move out of the way?
W : He raised it so quickly I didn't have time to react, to get
out of the way. I did jump when he shot the gun -- I ’ve never been
in anything like that before.
D: Was he moving all the while you saw him?
W: Yes - he paused when he took the shot at me, and that's when I
got a good look at his face.
D: Where were you looking during the other thirty seconds when
you weren't looking at the gunman's face?
W: At Larry. He was in bad shape, lying there on the floor.
D: Are you sure you didn't spend more than half the time looking
at Larry?
W : Oh, no. When I first came out from the back of the store, I
lookisd mainly at Larry. But when I realized what had happened,
I was looking mainly at the robbers. Like when the one raised 
the gun to take a shot at me, that really drew my attention. I 
spent at least half time - half of the rest of the time lockrnj 
at him,
D : You say the gun drew your attention?
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W; Well, of course. I couldn't believe what was happening, îjid 
when he raised the gun I was so stunned I could hardly take by eyes 
off it.
How far away were you standing from him?
Just about thirty feet.
Are you sure it wasn't 35 feet, let's say, or 40 feet? 
No - it was thirty feet.
Ifhen you made the identification at the police station, how 
long was that after the crime?
W: About a month.
D: Do you feel that you had a good enough look at the criminal's
face during all the excitement to be able to identify him a month
later?
W: Oh, yes. Yes.
D: Let me ask you this. When you went down to the police station
to make the identifiecation, did the police say anything to you 
before showing you the suspect?
W : Ch, the sergeant said that they had a suspect that fitted the
description that I had given them. He said he was pretty sure that, 
ah, he was the right man.
D; Did he say anything else to you?
W: He mentioned what a tough case this had been for them and how 
glad they were going to be to have it closed and off the books.
D: Was there anything distinctive or unusual about the defendant's
face that helped you identify him?
W: No, I just remembered vriiat he looked like.
D; V/hat would you say were the features you relied upon to lientify
him?
W; Oh, his brown hair, his average build and height, and ohat iocK 
on his face.
D: Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the criminal rather
than merely resembling the criminal?
gpW ; Oh, I'm certain,
D: Mr. Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify that he shopped
in your store two or three times during the two or three months prior
to the crime?
W: Oh, yes, yes,
D: Well, is it possible that you identified the defendant because
you remember seeing him in your store before and he Just happens 
to resemble the actual criminal?
V: Mo - no, no. I'm sure he's the man, I could never forget that
look on his face.
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SECTION C
GENERAL EXPERT TESTIMONY BY PSYCHOLOGIST TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction - (read to subjects t]/ blind experimental assistant) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of videotape of the trial, the 
defending attorney asked Dr, Walters how accurate, in general, the 
average eyewitness is,"
General Expert Testimony
Defense Attorney: ....would you say the average eyewitness is?
Dr. Walters: Research using staged crimes has shown that, depend­
ing on the conditions, anywhere from to 35^ of eyewitnesses may 
choose a wrong person from the lineup or a group of pictures. That 
is, depending upon the conditions, 1̂ % to of the eyewitnesses 
choose a person from the lineup that they believe is the criminal 
but who in reality is not the criminal, but rather is an innocent 
suspect.
D: Could you elaborate for us on how these researchers stage crimes
for the eyewitnesses to observe?
W: Many have the subjects view films of crimes, other studies use
crimes staged by the experimenter. After the subjects see the 
crime, they are asked at a later time to identify the criminal 
from a lineup of people or from a group of pictures,
D: So the eyewitnesses in this research do sometimes see an ac­
tual event?
W: Yes. In some of the experiments that have been done, the sub­
jects do see actual live events,. Often a theft or assault is staged 
for the subjects, so it's relatively common to use a live event, but 
not as common as films because the psychologists want to have some 
control of the materials so you know every time you are presenting 
it to a new group of people you are presenting e x a c t l y  the same -'â/, 
whereas a live event might change a little bit each time it's 
presented,
D: Could you give us an eja,mple of one of these staged events?
W: A situation that's used fairly often is to have someone attack
or assault a professor while he's lecturing in front of a c-i-ege 
classroom. The criminal is aotuall:' staging the attack and “he 
professor knows the attack is going to happen, but to the audience 
it looks like a real assault is taking place. The people in the 
class are then asked to pick uhe attacker cut of a lineup of people 
or a set of pictures. In this type of experiment, the people an 
the audience, the eyewitnesses to the crime, are often unrelaaole 
and innaccurate in their identification.
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D: Why do eyewitnesses make errors in identifying the person who
committed the crime?
W: Part of the reason is that identifying the criminal is made
difficult usually by the circumstances and the conditions under 
which the crime and its identification take place.
D: Is eyewitness identification of a criminal usually different from,
let's say, recognising a friend on the street?
W: Yes, very different. Recognition of a friend is nearly alirays
easier since you've seen that friend repeatedly. The repeated 
viewings of the friend's face and the context of your meetings 
with the friend help your memory and allow you to identify the 
friend to the point of near perfection. The eyewitness to a crime 
is usually being asked to identify a face he is not familiar with 
in a situation he has rarely, if ever, dealt with before. So 
the eyewitness to a crime is often much more likely to make a 
mistaken identification.
D: Describe how the eyewitness* memory records - records, rather,
the image of the criminal and how errors might occur during this 
recording.
W: Well, first, let me say the brain does not work like a mechanical
recording device. Research over the last fifty years does not support 
looking at the brain as if it worked like a videotape recorder.
People just don't passively record events, memories are constructed 
through conscious and unconscious processes. Psychologists usually 
break memory into three stages. The first stage, called the 
acquisition stage, occurs when the eyewitness is viewing or perceiving 
the crime. During this time, only some aspects of the situation are 
attended to. Once the c^ime has been perceived, the information and 
impressions are stored in memory. Memory for an event usually doesn't 
stay the same, it may change during the second stage, called the 
retention stage. During the retention stage, information that 
was once part of the original memozp^ of the crime might be losr, 
new information the person receives might change tre memciy of the 
crime. Finally, during retrieval, how the information in the 
memory is retrieved or called to mind by the eyewitness usually 
affects or even distorts the remembered image.
D; So you're saying that errors or changes in memory can occur 
during any or all of the three stages?
W: Yes, they can occur when the memory is first acquired, d'uring
the time you retain the memor;̂ '', and when you retrieve the memor;. 
Errors can occur ar various points since there are se''̂ eral uifierent 
types of memorj^.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by blind experimental assistant} - 
"At the ber;inning of this portion of videotape of the trial, the 
prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Walters what he meant when he said 
there are different types of memory,"
Prosecution
Prosecutor: What do you mean when you- say there are different types
of memory?
Dr. Walters: Research supports there being three different types
of memory - sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory.
P: How are these thiree types of memory related?
W: Sensory memory lasts a very short time, usually a matter of a
fraction of a second. Large amounts of information are storel there 
for just a very brief period of time. Only part of this information 
is transferred to short-term memory. Here the information will re­
main for at most a half minute or so. If the information is not 
rehearsed, the information in short-term memory will be lost. If 
the person rehearses the information in short-term memory, it may 
be transferred into long-term memory, where the information can 
be stored for a much longer period of time, months, perhaps years.
P: Could some of the information be lost in transfer between the
different types of memory?
W: Yes, first of all, the initial perception of an event may not
be complete or vrithout distortion to begin with. Also, only some 
of the information from sensory memory will be stored in shcrt-term 
memory, so information is lost in the transfer from sensory to 
short-term memory. Only a portion of the material in shorm-term 
memory, material that's rehearsed by the person, is transferred 
to long-term memory. Even when information is stored in long-term 
memory, parts of the memory tend to be lost over time, or the 
memory may change over time because of events that happen later.
P: What do you mean when you say memory can change because of the
events that happen later?
W : A person receiving new information concerning an event after
the person has witnessed the event may often include the new in­
formation as part of his description of his memory ^or that origi­
nal event. In practical terms, this means a person may often remem­
ber what he was’later told he should have seen, rather than what
he actually saw. In many cases, it's almost as if the new in­
formation has become part of the original memory.
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P; What is the best way another person can tell if an eyewit­
ness' memory for the criminal is accurate?
W: The person should pay close attention to the situational fac­
tors that may help or hinder the accuracy of the eyewitness' 
perception of and recall of the crime, as well as the factors that 
may influence the eyewitness' recognition of a person as the 
criminal,
P: Would the eyeuritness* confidence in the identification be any
indication of how accurate the identification is?
W: There is considerable research evidence showing that the con­
fidence of an -eyewitness may have little or no relationship to the 
accuracy of the eyewitness. No, the confidence of the eyewitness 
in his identification is not a good indicator of how accurate his 
identification is likely to be.
P: What if the eyewitness is so confident that he identified the
right person as the criminal that he says, "I’ll never forget that 
face. I'm sure that's the man" after making an identification.
Would a statement like that increase the likelihood that the wit­
ness made an accurate identification?
W: Again, the relationship of confidence to accuracy has gener­
ally been found to be weak to nonexistant. It would not be un­
common for a highly confident witness to be wrong, to be entirely 
in error, even if he made a statement like that.
Pi Dr. Walters, could you summarize for the court how a person 
might besrt judge the accuracy of an eyewitness identification?
W: As I mentioned earlier, depending on the conditions, anywhere
from to 83% of eyewitnesses may choose a wrong person from a 
lineup. Identification of a criminal is very different from recog­
nizing a friend. The eyewitness to a crime is usually being asked 
to identify a face he is not familiar with, in a situation he has 
rarely, if ever, dealt with before. Memory is a complex process, 
and information for an event can be lost or distorted during ac­
quisition of the inf ozonation, during retention or storage of the 
information, or during retrieval of the information. There are 
several different types of memory - sensory memory, short-oerm 
memory, long-term memory/-. A lot of information is usually xost in 
transfer from one type of memory to another, fven when the inform; 
tion is stored in long-term memory, parts of memory for an evenr ox 
be lost over time or the memory may change over time because of 
events that happen later. There are many factors, then, w h i c h  m a y  
influence or distort an eyewitness' perception of a n d  m e m o r y  : -r a 
criminal. It is very important to pay attention to the c o n d . o i T n n  
or circumstances which mav influence or distort the e y e w i t n e s s '
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accuracy, A person attempting to judge whether an eyewitness has 
identified the criminal or an innocent suspect should avoid placing 
any faith in the eyewitness' confidence. In short, in order to tell 
if an eyewitness is accurate, one should place little stock in how 
confident the eyewitness is about the identification and should in­
stead focus on situational factors that may have facilitated or 
Inhibited the accuracy of the eyewitness.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by blind experimental assistant) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of ^/ideotape of the trial, the de­
fending attorney asked Dr. Walters how accurate, in general, the 
average eyewitness is."
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony
Defense Attorney: ....how accurate would you say the average
eyewitness is?
Dr. Walters: Research using staged crimes has shown that, depending
on the condixions, anywhere from to of eyewitnesses may choose 
a wrong person from a lineup or group of pictures. That is, depend­
ing upon the conditions, 15^ to 3^% of eyewitnesses choose a person
from the lineup that they believe is the criminal but who in reality 
is not the criminal, but rather is an innocent suspect.
D: Could you elaborate for us how these researchers stage crimes
for the eyewitnesses to observe?
W: Many have the subjects view films of crimes, other studies use
crimes staged by the experimenter. After the subjects see the 
crime, they are asked at a later time to identify the criminal 
from a lineup of people or from a group of pictures,
D: So then the eyewitnesses in this research do sometimes see an
actual event?
W: Yes. In some of the experiments that have been done, the sub­
jects do see actual live events. Often a uheft or assault is staged 
for the subjects, so it's relatively common to use a" live event, but 
not as common as films because the psychologists want to have seme 
control of the materials so you know every time you are presenuintr 
it to a new group of people you are presenting exactly the sam5 
thing, whereas a live event mignt change a little bit each time 
Jt's presented.
D: Could you give us an example of one of these staged crimes?
V: A situation chat’s used fairly often is to have someone attack
or assault a professor while he's lecturing in front a college 
classroom. The criminal is actually staging the attack and the 
professor knows the attack is going to happen, but tc sue audience 
it looks like a real assault is taking place. The people in uhe 
class are then asked to pick the attacker out of a lineup of peo­
ple or out of a set of clôtures. In this cj'pe O" experiment, tne 
people in the audience, tne eyewitnesses to this crime, are oiten 
unreliable and innaccrrate in their identifications.
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D: What axe some of the factors that affect eyewitness* memory
and ability to make an accurate identification?
W: There are several physical factors that affect eyewitness re­
liability. The lighting conditions, the distance of the eyewitness 
from the criminal are factors. There should be adequate: light - 
the eyewitness should be close enough to make an identification.
Also, whether the criminal was moving or not may be important - 
fast movement may lower the likelihood of an accurate identifica­
tion,
D ; What about time and its effects on memory?
W: Generally, the shorter the time span the eyewitness has seen
the criminal, the more likely it is that the identification may 
be in error. The length of time from seeing the crime to identi­
fying the criminal is also important - research has generally 
shown that parts of memory are lost over time.
D: What are some of the other factors that affect an eyewitness*
ability to make an accurate identification?
W: One of the major factors is stress. Research indicates that
people under stress are more likely to make certain types of errors.
D : What are seme of these errors?
W; Stress often causes people to overestimate the amount of time 
the event or crime took. That is, what may only have taken 
10 to 15 seconds may seen like it took much longer, say a minute, 
or ,even five minutes. So the amount of time that an eyewitness 
views the criminal's face may be an over estimation if the person 
is under a lot of stress. There are factors related to stress 
such as violence and the presence of a weapon that also reauce 
eyewitness ability to make a correct identification.
D: How does the presence of violence influence eyewitnesses?
W: Research supports the idoa that people viewing a violent, emo­
tional event or crime are less likel^r to be sole to accurately re­
port what they saw than people who see a nonviolent event. Re­
searchers explain this effect as being due to the emcrionaliry or 
stress associated with the violent event. You sec, there is research 
which supports stress having a number of general effecus upon the 
way a person sees an event or crime. I mentioned cefore the ten­
dency for people under stress to overestimate the amount of time 
the crime took. Stress can also have a restricting exiect on atten­
tion - people just don't pay as much attention to what's going on - 
particularly if there is a weapon, such as a gun or knife, present 
at the scene of the crime.
108
D: How does the presence of a gun affect the way a person perceives
or sees a crime?
V: Dr. Loftus, one of the leading researchers and authorities in
the field of eyewitness testimony, talks about a factor called "wea­
pon focus." What happens when a weapon is present is it tends to 
capture some of the witness' processing time and capacity, leaving 
less time available for other details and for other aspects of the 
incident, weapon focus may have the effect of reducing the ability 
to describe and remember other aspects of the situation, such as 
remembering the person who was holding the weapon. However, people 
often have a very good ability to describe the weapon. That's what 
is meant by weapon focus.
D ; What about the number of criminals committing a crime, would that 
affect the ability of an eyewitness to accurately perceive a crime?
W; Yes. Research has found that the more criminals present, the 
less accurate eyewitnesses report of the crime is. Again, d'oring 
a brief period of time, having more than one criminal present re- 
q^uires more processing time. There's only so many details aperson 
can process in a short period of time, '
D : Are there any kinds or types of faces that are more likely to be
remembered by an eyewitness?
W: Yes, people usually remember really unusual or distinctive faces
easier, research has shown, that they do this better than remembering 
faces with no distinctive features. For instance, someone with an 
unusual nose, or someone with a noticeable scar on his face is more 
likely to be remembered by the eyewitness than someone who has no 
unusual features or an "average" looking face that's similar to a 
lot of other persons.
D : Is it possible that an eyewitness might mis identify someone as
the criminal because his face looks familiar because of a contact 
sometime before the crime?
W: Yes, the term for this is "unconscious transference". This
happens when an eyewitness confuses a person seen in one situation 
with a person that was seen in a different situation or in a cifferern 
context. People will look at faces that they have seen at a differern 
time - in different contexts - and mistakenly relate those- laces 
back to an incorrect situation.
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Introduction - (read.to subjects by blind experimental assistant) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of videotape of the trial, the 
prosecuting attorney asked Dr, Walters to give an example of un­
conscious transference,"
Prosecution
Prosecutor: Could you give an example of unconscious transference?
Dr, Walters; Patrick Wall has given a classic example of a train 
clerk who was robbed at gunpoint. The train clerk subseauently went 
to a lineup and picked a sailor out of the lineup. The sailor did 
not commit the robbery, had a very good alibi, but had purchased 
tickets from this train clerk on three prior occasions. What is
happening in this situation, the train clerk, the witness, goes to
the lineup. In fact, there is a face in the lineup that looks
familiar and that familiarity is mistakenly related back to the
crime, rather than back to the purchasing of the tickets. That's a 
classic example of unconscious transference.
P: Are there factors which can affect an eyewitness* identification
Of a suspect, let's say, when he's asked to do so by the police?
W: It's very important that the eyevritness have the opportunity to
pick the suspect out of a "fair" lineup. The chances of a misidenti- 
fication are reduced if the eyewitness chooses a person out of a 
group of persons who bear a reasonable resemblance to each other, 
who look at least somewhat alike. For instance, people in the lineup 
are the same race, same sex, no gross height or weight difference.
If that is done, the chance of a misidentification is reduced. It 
is generally agreed that the worst method to use and the method 
with the greatest likelihood of a wrong person being identified as 
the criminal is what's called a "sho%mp. " In a shoïvup the police 
simply show the eyewitness a suspect by himself and ask the eyewitness 
if that's the person who committed the crime.
P: What are some of the factors that make showing only one person
to the eyewitness a poor procedure?
W : The eyeifitness often believes that the police have a good rea­
son for shoT-îing them the suspect, that they have seme incriminating 
evidence against the suspect, something like this. There are often 
subtle but powerful, psychological pressures on the eyewitness to 
identify the suspect as the criminal. This effect will be especially 
increased if the police put pressure on the eyewitness to identify 
the suspect, for example,, they might tell the eyewitness that they
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W: (cont.) thinJc they have the right man, or by indicating that 
they'll be pleased if the eyewitness can identify the suspect.
People are often especially likely to be influenced by someone 
in authority, such as the police. Showing only one suspect to 
the eyewitness is likely to increase psychological factors in­
fluencing the witness to identify the suspect as the criminal.
P: Would the eyewitness* confidence in the identification be any
indication of how accurate the identification is?
W: There is considerable research evidence showing that the con­
fidence of an eyewitness may have little or no relationship to the 
accuracy of the eyewitness. The confidence of the eyewitness in 
his identification is not a good indicator of how accurate his 
identification is likely to be.
Pî What if the eyewitness is so confident that he identified the 
right person as the criminal that he says, "I'd never forget that 
face, I'm sure that's the man" after making an identification.
Would a statement like that increase the likelihood that the witness 
made an accurate identification?
W: Again, the relationship of confidence to accuracy has generally
been found to be weak to nonexistant. It would not be uncommon for 
a highly confident witness to be wrong, to be entirely in error, even 
if he made a statement like that,
P: Dr, Walters, could you summarise for the court how a person might
best judge the accuracy of an eyewitness identification?
W: As I mentioned earlier, depending on the conditions, anywhere
from 15^ to of eyewitnesses may choose a wrong person from a
lineup. It is important that they pay attention to conditions or 
circumstances which may distort or influence the eyewitness' tes­
timony, Specifically, one should pay attention to the conditions 
under which the crime occurred. Such factors as lighting and how 
far the witness was from the criminal are important. One should 
note whether the situation was a dynamic and changing one - whether 
there was a lot of rapid, quick movement. Eyewitnesses often do 
worse under these conditions. Stress is a major factor - if the 
eyewitness was mhreatened, if there was violence involved - if a 
weapon was present, there is a greater likelihood of misioentifica­
tion. It is important to consider that stress may lead to the eye­
witness overestimating the amount of time the crime toor: which may 
involve an over estimation of the amount of time the eyewioness mac. 
to view the criminal's face. The number of criminals is imporiant, 
as the number of criminals may reduce accuracy since it may cut 
down on the amount of time the eyewitness has available to process
Ill
W: (cont.) other variables. Time has important effects upon mem­
ory - the time the eyewitness actually had to view the criminal, 
the time between the crime and the identification by the eyewitness 
may have major bearing on whether an accurate identification has 
been made. The circumstances of the identification should be con­
sidered, One should consider whether a "fair" lineup was con­
ducted, remembering that a "showup" or one-person lineup is tne 
poorest condition under which the identification can take place.
One should also pay attention to possible indications that the 
eyewitness was put under pressure from the police or from author­
ities to identify the suspect as the criminal. Generally, wit­
nesses are more likely to correctly identify 'cnusual - or distinc­
tive faces. One should also be aware that if the eyewitness has 
seen the suspect previously in some other contexrb, that the eye­
witness may have identified the person not because he was identi­
fied with the crime, but because the suspect*s face is familiar - 
mistakenly related back tc the crime, A person attempting to judge 
whether an eyewitness has identified the criminal or an innocent 
suspect should avoid placing any faith in the eyewitness' con­
fidence, In short, in order to tell if an eyewitness is accurate, 
one should place little stock in how confident the eyewitness is 
about the identification and should instead focus on situational 
factors, including those I have mentioned, that may have facili­
tated or inhibited, the accuracy of the eyewitness.
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SECTION E
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Judge Walters: Research using stage crimes has shown that, de­
pending on the conditions, anywhere from to 85/Ô of eyewitnesses 
may choose a wrong person from a lineup or a group of pictures.
That is, depending upon the conditions, 15% ro 85% of the eyewit- 
nesse*^ choose a person from the lineup that they believe is the 
criminal but who in reality is not the criminal, but rather is 
an innocent suspect*
Part of the reason eyewitnesses make errors in identifying 
the criminal is that it is usually made difficult by the circum­
stances and conditions under which the crime and its identifica­
tion take place. Eyewitness identification of a criminal is very 
different from recognizing a friend in the street. Recognition 
of a friend is nearly always easier since you've seen that friend 
repeatedly. The repeated viewings of the friend's face and the 
context of your meetings with the friend help your memory and 
allow you to identify the friend to the point of near perfection.
The eyewitness to a crime is usually being asked to identify a 
face hè is not familiar with in a situation he has rarely, if 
ever, dealt with before. So the eyewitness to a crime is often 
much more likely to make a mistaken identification.
There has been a large amount of research done over the 
last fifty years to discover how memorj'’ works. This research 
does not support the notion that the brain works like a video­
tape recorder. Memory can be broken down into three stages.
The first stage, called the acquisition stage, occurs when the 
eyewitness is viewing or perceiving the crime. During this time, 
only some aspects of the situation are attended tc. Cnee the crime 
has been perceived, the information and impressions are stored in 
memory, Memory for an event usually doesn't stay the same, it may 
change during the second stage, called tne retention stage. D'cring 
the retention stage, information that was once part of the original 
memory of the crime might be lost, new information the person re­
ceives might change the memory of the crime, Finally, during re­
trieval, hou the information in the memory is retrieved cr 0alien 
to mind by the eyewitness usually affects or even distorts the 
remembered image. Errors or changes in memory can occur during any 
or all of the three stages. They can occur when the memory is first 
acquired, during the time you return the memor]/, and when you re­
trieve the memory. Memory can also change because of ore even ms 
that happen later, A person receiving new information coucerr.i.nc 
an event after the person has witnessed the evens may citer in­
clude the new information as part of his description of nis m^ncry 
for that original event. In practical terms, this means a parson 
may often remember what he was later told he should nave seen, 
rather than what he actually saw. In many cases, in s aj.nosc as 
if the new information has become part of the original, memory.
114The best way, you, as jurors, can tell if an eyewitness’ 
memory for the criminal is accurate is to pay close attention to 
the situational factors that may help or hinder the accuracy of the 
eyewitness' perception of and recall of the crime, as well as the 
factors that may influence the eyewitness' recognition of a person 
as the criminal.
The confidence of the eyevritness in his identification is not 
a good indicator of how accurate his identification is likely to 
be. There is considérable research evidence snowdng that the con­
fidence of an eyewi tness may have little or no relationship to the 
accuracy of the eyevdtness, It would not be uncommon for a highly 
confident witness to make a statement such as "I'll never forget 
that face, I'm sure that's the man", and be wrong, entirely in 
error.
In summary’, depending on the conditions, any^rhere from to
85^ of eyewitnesses nay choose a wrong person from a lineup. 
Identification of a criminal is very different from recognizing a 
friend. The eyewitness to a crime is usually being asked to identify 
a face he is not familiar with, in a situation he has rarely, if 
ever, dealt with before. Memory is a complex process, and infor­
mation for an event can be lost or distorted during acquisition of 
the information, during retention or storage of the information, 
or during retrieval of the information. Parts of memory ior an 
event may be lost over time or the memory may change over time be­
cause of events that happen later. There are many factors, then, 
which may influence or distort an eyewitness ’ perception of fuid 
memory for a crimianl. It is very important to pay attention to 
the conditions or circumstances which may influence or distort the 
eyewitness' accuracy, A person attempting to judge whether an 
eyewitness has identified the criminal or an innocent suspect should 
avoid placing any faith in the eyewitness' confidence. In short, 
in order to tell if an eyewitness is accurate, one whould place 
little stock in how confident the eyewitness is about the identi­
fication and should instead focus on situational factors that may 
have facilitated or inhibited the accuracy of the eyewitness.
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DEPENDENT MEASURES
1. Do you believe the eyewitness identified the gunman or an innocent 
person? Circle one of the choices below:
Gunman Innocent Person
2. How confident are you about your decision in the above question? 
Indicate your answer by circling a number on the scale provided 
below:
1------ 2------ 3-
not at
all confident
8- — 10
absolutely
confident
3. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, rate the probability 
of the defendant's guilt by circling one of the numbers on the scale 
below:
Definitely Definitely
Not Guilty Guilty
4. How confident was the eyewitness in the videotape in his ability to 
identify the gunman? Indicate your answer by circling a number on 
the scale provided below:
Not at all Definitely
Confident Confident
5. Estimate the percentage of people who would make a correct identifie; 
tion under the circumstances described by the eyewitness by circling 
one of the percentages provided below:
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 30% 90% 100%
6. To what extent do you believe that you can generally tell from an 
eyewitness' confidence in his testimony whether or not the eyewit­
ness made an accurate identification? Indicate your answer cy 
circling a number on the scale provided below:
1------ 2------ 3-
Can almost 
never Cell 
if eyewitness 
is accurate
— 10
Can almost 
always tell 
if eyewitness 
is accurate
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7. VThât percentage of eyewitness testimony, in general, do you 
believe is accurate? Circle one of the percentages below;
8.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness identified 
the gunman or an innocent person, how much did you base your 
decision upon the eyewitness' description of the crime? Circle 
one of the numbers on the scale below:
1---------2----------3—
Did not 
base decision 
on eyewitness' 
description of 
crime at all
■8----9---- 10
Based decision 
largely upon 
eyewitness' 
description of 
the crime
9. In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness identified 
the gunman or an innocent person, how much did you base your 
decision upon the eyewitness' confidence in his testimony? 
Circle one of the numbers on the scale below:
Did not base 
decision on 
the eyewit­
ness' confi­
dence at all
Based decision 
largely upon 
the eyewitness' 
confidence
10. Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following state­
ment on the scale provided below: The film presented a realistic
example of an eyewitness testimony.
-3----4----5----6----7----8-1----2--- ---9----10
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
(^Yexpert testimony by psychologist conditions)
11. How much did the psychologist's expert testimony affect your 
decision concerning whether you thought the eyewitness idontif' 
the gunman or an innocent person? Circle one of the numbers 
below:
ea
1--- 2----3---- 4—
Did not
base decision
on the psychologist's
expert testimony
at all
-8- 9--- 10
Based decision 
largely upon the 
psychologist's 
expert testimony
12
II
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Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement 
on the scale provided below: The film presented a realistic and
believable example of a psychologist giving testimony on researc; 
in the area of eyewitness testimony.
1 2-
Strongly
Disagree
■8* - 1 0
Strongly
Agree
(#2expert testimony by judge conditions)
How much did the judge's expert testimony affect your decision 
concerning whether you thought the eyewitness identified the gun­
man or an innocent person? Circle one of the numbers on the 
scale below:
Did Not 
base decision 
on the judge's 
expert testimony 
at all
—— —10
Based decision 
largely upon the 
judge's expert 
testimony
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Rate your agreement cr disagreement with the following statement 
on the scale provided below: The film presented a realistic and
believable example of a judge giving testimony on research in th, 
area of eyewitness testimony.
- 3 - - - - 4 ---- 5 - - - - 6 ---- 7---- 8-1 2-
Strongly
Disagree
■9 10
Strongly
Agree
Have vou ever seen the judge depicted in the videotape before? 
so, in what capacity?
If
(All conditions)
14. Please describe in your own words in the space below how you decided 
that the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent person:
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Please pro\âde your age, sex, year in college, and college major 
on the lines below. All information will be held strictly con­
fidential.
Ages
Sex: M F (circle one)
Year in College: 1 2  3 ^  graduate student (circle one)
College M a j o r : _________________________________________________
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes HO (circle one)
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SECTION G
INTRODUCTION TO EYEWITNESS VIDEOTAPES
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The purpose of the present investigation is to determine the nature 
of decision making among jurors. Please read the following description 
of a crime after which you will be viewing portions of a trial via video­
tape. You will then be asked to render a verdict as well as answer sev­
eral other questions on the basis of the evidence presented. Obviously, 
this is only a summary of the actual court proceedings. However, please 
Imagine yourself to be in a courtroom situation and assume that you are 
ân actual member of the jury. If you feel that you cannot do this, 
please indicate this immediately.
You will shortly be viewing portions of a trial via videotape concern­
ing the robbery and murder which took place in a large town in Montana on
November 14, 1981. Previous to the portions of the trial you are viewing, 
the defendant had testified and stated the following points:
(1) that he did not commit the crime,
(2) that he had been in town for only three months and had not had the
opportunity to develop close friends or ties in the town,
(3) that he was at home in his apartment sleeping the night of the 
crime, and
(4) that he had shopped at the 7-11 convenience store in question two or 
three times in the three months since moving to the town three months 
ago.
Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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SECTION H
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT TESTIMONY BY PSYCHOLOGIST VIDEOTAPES
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Dr, Al Walters is a Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist who has been asked 
by the defense to testify as an expert on eyewitness testimony and memory. 
Dr. Walters has 18 years of forensic and courtroom experience, and has 
testified in numerous criminal cases. He is also a Clinical Psychology
professor who teaches graduate forensic psychology courses. Additionally,
he actively conducts, studies, and publishes research in the area of eye­
witness testimony and memory.
Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT TESTIMONY BY JUDGE VIDEOTAPES
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Judge Walters has been a judge for the state of Montana for the past 
10 years. Prior to becoming a judge, he was a practicing attorney in Montana 
for 8 years. Additionally, he has taught law school classes and has actively 
conducted studies and published rejfaarch in the area of eyewitness testimony.
Please pay close attention to the videotape.
